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Abstract
The United States and some of its major allies have been negotiating for some time concern-
ing the establishment of an “alternative” seabed mining regime. Before confronting this issue,
however, several threshold issues will be addressed. These will include descriptions of the nodule
mining venture, the proposed UNCLOS regime to govern it, and the most recent developments
in the U.S. backed “alternative” or reciprocating states” regime. After addressing the “objective
regime” hypothesis, a strategy for avoiding potential U.S. estoppel to deny the validity of UNC-
LOS’ seabed mining regulations will be explored. Finally, possible scenarios for future seabed
regulations and their attendant legislative and political ramifications will be explored.
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INTRODUCTION
It is likely that the recovery of seabed' polymetallic nodules2 is
currently, like the capture of midoceanic fish, 3 a recognized free-
dom of the seas, open to all on a nonexclusive basis. 4 Nevertheless,
*Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Oklahoma City University School of Law.
LL.M. 1975, Harvard Law School; J.D. 1974, California Western School of Law; B.A. 1970,
George Washington University. This Article is the fifth of a series of seabed and ocean law-
oriented publications by the author. The others, which will be referenced herein, are: Arrow,
Prospective Impacts of the Draft Sea Convention, 1 INT'L PaOP. INV. J. 225 (1983); Arrow,
The "Alternative" Seabed Mining Regime: 1981, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (1981); Arrow, The
Customary Norm Process and the Deep Seabed, 9 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 1 (1981); Arrow,
The Proposed Regime for the Unilateral Exploitation of Deep Seabed Minerals by the United
States, 21 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 337 (1980).
1. The term, as used here, refers exclusively to the deep seabed beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction, which includes both areas 350 miles or more seaward from the baseline,
and those areas beyond the continental margin. See United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, art. 76, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1285 (1982),
reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), corrections, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122/
Corr.3 (1982); U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122/Corr.8 (1982) [hereinafter cited as UNCLOS].
2. The nodules are largely composed of manganese, iron, and silicon, and have traces of
up to 25 additional minerals as well. See infra text accompanying notes 13-28 (description of
nodules).
3. Free-swimming fish have been recognized as res nullius (the thing of no one), subject
to ownership through capture, since shortly after Grotius' famous 1619 metaphor of the
fisherman and the slave: "[W]hen the slave says: 'The sea is certainly common to all persons,'
the fisherman agrees; but when the slave adds: 'Then what is found in the common sea is
common property,' he rightly objects, saying: 'But what my net and hooks have taken, is
absolutely my own.' " H. CROTIUS, MARE LiBEuM 29 (R. McGoffin trans. 1916). See also
UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 87(1)(e) (freedom of fishing); Convention on the High Seas,
Apr. 28, 1958, art. 2(2), 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2314, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 3450 U.N.T.S. 82, 84
(freedom of fishing) [hereinafter cited as High Seas Convention]; J. BRIERLY, TiE LAW OF
NATIONS 305 (H. Waldock 6th ed. 1963) (freedom of high seas); cf. infra text accompanying
notes 48-52 (application of free seas principle to sea beds).
4. Since the seabed, however, is not a terra nullius (land of no one), it is not subject to
any exclusive claims. Like the surface of the high seas, its use is open to all. See UNCLOS,
supra note 1, arts. 89, 137(1); High Seas Convention, supra note 3, art. 2; Arrow, The
Proposed Regime for the Unilateral Exploitation of Deep Seabed Minerals by the United
States, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 337, 356-65 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Arrow, The Proposed
Regime]. But cf. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 136, 137(2), (3) (common heritage of man-
kind, preclusion of state claims of sovereignty, and rights in resources rested in mankind).
The major qualification concerning the traditional freedom of nonexclusive use is the doc-
trine that all such freedoms must be exercised by all states with reasonable regard for the
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the argument will undoubtedly be maintained by some that broad
participation in the UNCLOS regime, 5 or some intrinsic character-
istic of the treaty itself, will have rendered it, at some point in time,
an "objective regime," 6 capable of binding third-party nonsigna-
tory states (probably including the United States) without their
consent. The result of such a conclusion, of course, would be to
legally preclude any seabed mining other than as authorized by
UNCLOS.
While the "objective regime" contention would appear incon-
sistent with the res inter alios acta rule, now codified in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties,7 it cannot be summarily dis-
missed, both because of the purported "exceptions" contained in
articles 35 and 38 of the Vienna Convention, and because numerous
and qualified publicists have, over long periods of time, maintained
the existence of various other exceptions to the res inter alios acta
principle. 8 The suggested application to UNCLOS of an "objective
regime" exception to the res inter alios acta rule, therefore, necessi-
tates a fresh look at the purported exceptions and their criteria.
Their applicability to UNCLOS' seabed mining provisions is partic-
ularly relevant because the United States and some of its major
allies have been negotiating for some time concerning the establish-
interests of other states in their exercises of their freedoms. See High Seas Convention, supra
note 3, art. 2; M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 83, 85, 691-93
(1962); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 585 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
5. "UNCLOS," as used herein, refers not to the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121 (1982) [hereinafter cited as UNCLOS III], but
rather to UNCLOS, supra note 1. See also Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea, 21 I.L.M. 1245 (1982), reprinted in U.N. Doc A/CONF.62/121 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Final Act]. The United States-backed regime might ultimately provide a
legal seabed mining framework for those nations, possibly including the United States, which
fail to ratify UNCLOS and its "parallel system" seabed provisions. See generally infra notes
54-217.
6. An "objective regime," sometimes also referred to as a "law-making treaty," may be
defined as a regime which, arguably by its nature may bind third-party nonratifying states
without their consent.
7. Opened for signature May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), reprinted in 63 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 875 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. Article 34 of the Vienna
Convention provides that: "A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third
[s]tate without its consent." Id. art. 34, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. at 886. The rule stated
in article 34 may be used interchangeably with its antecedant maxim pacta tertus nec nocent
nec prosunt (i.e. treaties between others do not create rights or duties for third states), or its
more colloquial form res inter alias acta (i.e. things done between others do not create duties
for non-parties). For simplicity, the principle will be referred to herein as the res inter alios
acta rule.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 251-355.
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ment of an "alternative" seabed mining regime.'
Before confronting this issue, however, several threshold issues
will be addressed. These will include descriptions of the nodule
mining venture, the proposed UNCLOS regime to govern it,' 0 and
the most recent developments" in the U.S. backed "alternative" or
"reciprocating states"' 2 regime. After addressing the "objective re-
gime" hypothesis, a strategy for avoiding potential United States
estoppel to deny the validity of UNCLOS' seabed mining regula-
tions will be explored. Finally, possible scenarios for future seabed
regulation and their attendant legislative and political ramifica-
tions will be explored.
I. THE NODULES
A. Discovery and Distribution
In 1872, Sir Wyville Thompson was commissioned by the
British government to explore the world's oceans. In 1874, the
expedition, aboard H.M.S. Challenger, discovered and retrieved
some baseball-sized nodules from depths of 5000 to 20,000 feet.' 3
Title to the nodules, then analogized to free-swimming fish, was
9. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 218-43, 457-67 ("alternative" seabed mining re-
gime).
10. Concerning the nodules themselves, see, e.g., T. KRONMILLFR, THE LAWFULNESS OF
SEABED MINING 457 (1979); E. LUARD, THE CONTROL OF THE SEABED 16-20 (1976); J. ME o,
THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE SEA passim (1965); A. POST, DEEPSEA MINING AND THE LAW
OF THE SEA 1-56 (1983). Concerning the UN seabed regime, contained primarily in articles
133-91 of UNCLOS, supra note 1, and in id. Annexes 3 and 4, see, e.g., A. PosT, supra, at
172-233; Arrow, Prospective Impacts of the Draft Sea Convention, 1 INT'L PaoP. INV. J. 225,
247-51 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Arrow, Prospective Impacts].
11. For earlier developments in the regime, see Arrow, The "Alternative" Seabed
Mining Regime: 1981, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 1-28 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Arrow, The
"Alternative" Seabed]; see also Nat'l Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Dep't of
Com., Further Regulations on Deep Seabed Mining, 47 Fed. Beg. 5966-71 (1982), reprinted
in 21 I.L.M. 867 (1982).
12. The "alternative" regime is sometimes referred to as a "reciprocating states" regime
due to the reciprocal nature of license- recognition by the United States and its allies. While
recognizing that no sovereign or exclusive claims to seabed tracts can be made as against the
world, each of the "reciprocating" states would limit their nationals' right to mine by way of
an exercise of citizenship jurisdiction, and would then recognize each others' licenses to their
citizens. See Arrow, The "Alternative" Seabed, supra note 11, at 2 n.3. This approach would
be effective even without sovereign or exclusive seabed claims provided, of course, that the
reciprocating states maintained their technological monopoly. Concerning this prospect, see
generally UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 144, 266-78, & Annex 3, art. 5 (transfer of technol-
ogy); A. POST, supra note 10, at 24-31 (technology of nodule retrieval surface and transporta-
tion systems, and processing).
13. See, e.g., Walz, The Deep Sea-Bed, in MAJOR ISSUES IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 67, 69
(D. Larson ed, 1976).
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never questioned,' 4 and they were stored, unanalyzed, in the base-
ment of the British Museum and the attic of the Natural History
Museum in Washington.' 5
During the early part of this century, German, French, and
United States oceanographic expeditions discovered further concen-
trations of nodules. In 1957, a sampling of nodules was taken in
relatively shallow waters near Tahiti. Later that year, the Institute
of Marine Research at the University of California conducted a
preliminary mining-feasibility study, and established the valuable
nature of the nodules' content.' 6
While the exact process by which the nodules are formed is
uncertain, experts theorize that deep ocean vents eject mineral-rich
material into the oceans. Ejected manganese ions then combine to
form manganese dioxide, which precipitates, attracting other
ejected metallic ions, including copper, cobalt, molybdenum and
nickel, 17 as well as silicon, iron, aluminum, magnesium, titanium,
barium, lead, strontium, zirconium, vanadium, and zinc (of this
latter group, only titanium, and vanadium are considered viable
for commercial exploitation at present). The electrical charges in
the metals draw them to sedentary objects such as shark's teeth,
whale bones, and clumps of various clays and muds. The metals
then form around the nucleus much like a pearl.' 8
Some man-made objects have been found on the ocean floor
encrusted with a marketable thickness of minerals. ' The rate of
deposit around organic cores has been measured at one ten-thou-
sandth of a millimeter per thousand years, 20 but the total volume
2
'
14. Goldie, A General International Law Doctrine for Seabed Regimes, 7 INT'L LAW.
796, 797 (1973).
15. Mero, The Great Nodule Controversy, in LAW OF THE SEA: CARACAS AND BEYOND
343 (1975) (F. Christy, Jr., T. Clingan, Jr., J. Gamble, Jr., H. Knight, & E. Miles eds. 1975)
(proceedings of the Law of the Sea Institute Ninth Annual Conference, January 6-9, 1975).
16. See generally A. POST, supra note 10, at 19 (brief history of nodule discovery and
mining technology development); Mero, supra note 15, at 343-44 (brief history of discovery
of nodules and their valuable economic nature).
17. These four metals are generally of the greatest mining value and concentration. A.
POST, supra note 10, at 14.
18. See generally, A. PosT, supra note 10, at 11-14; Alexander, Metal Rich Floor of
Ocean Lures Modern Prospectors, L.A. Times, Dec. 2, 1973, § 2, at 2, col. 2 (description of
the formation of the nodules).
19. E. LOARD, supra note 10, at 16.
20. Alexander, supra note 18, at 1, col. 3.
21. While early estimates by Mero and others place the potential Pacific Ocean reserves
alone at over 1.5 trillion tons, more recent estimates by the French AFERNOD consortium,
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of nodules is sufficient that even current studies indicate that total
nodule growth is faster than world consumption of the minerals
involved. 22
Most observers, including the four major mining consortia,2 3
have long assumed that the "best" nodule deposits were located in
the Clarion-Clipperton Fracture Zone in the mid-Pacific, south of a
line between Mazatlan, Mexico and Hawaii. This assumption,
however, has recently come into question. For example, Jane Fra-
zier of the Scripps Institute of Oceanography has classified portions
of even the Clarion-Clipperton region as "submarginal," containing
"resources which would require a substantially higher price or a
major cost-reducing advance in technology. ' 24 Nevertheless, some
portions of the zone will almost certainly contain commercially
recoverable nodules.
AFERNOD,25 the French consortium, has also reportedly
found high-grade and high density nodules in the South Pacific but,
unfortunately, not in the same place. AFERNOD may also have
discovered titanium-rich nodules with high concentrations of mo-
lybdenum and zinc within France's exclusive economic zone.26
India has been prospecting within its own economic zone in the
Indian Ocean, especially off the Andeman and Nicobar Islands,
and reportedly plans to purchase more vessels from France, Den-
mark, and the Federal Republic of Germany to further pursue its
explorations. Other promising areas, such as the Indian Ocean off
the coast of Madagascar and the exclusive economic zone of Chile,
remain largely unexplored. 27 Finally, the United States has discov-
ered polymetallic sulfide crusts within its exclusive economic zone
along the Gorda oceanic ridge off the coasts of California and
see infra note 25, conservatively estimate the Pacific reserves at only about 100 billion tons.
See A. POST, supra note 10, at viii.
22. Id. at 11.
23. The four major consortia are: Ocean Mining Associations (OMA), sometimes re-
ferred to as the "U.S. Steel Group"; Ocean Minerals Companies (OMCO), sometimes re-
ferred to as the "Lockheed Group"; Ocean Management, Inc. (OMI); and the Kennecott
Group.
24. Frazer, Resources in Seafloor Manganese Nodules, in DEEPSEA MINING 41, 44, 58 (J.
Kildow ed. 1980). But see A. HOLSER, MANGANESE NODULE RESOURCES AND MINE SITE
AVAILABILITY (1976) (provisional staff study, U.S. Ocean Minerals Admin.) The value of a
nodule deposit is judged by composition, density, and submarine geology.
25. AFERNOD is the acronym for L"Association Francaise pour I'Etude et la Recherche
des Nodules.
26. See A. POST, supra note 10, at 23.
27. Id. at 15, 23.
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Oregon. These crusts may have significant value and be more com-
mercially accessible than the nodules themselves.28
B. Technology and Economics
When it is recalled that transportation and processing costs
may exceed 50 % of total production expenditures,29 the scope of the
requisite investment necessary to harvest the nodules can be appre-
ciated. A 1978 study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
has estimated the start-up costs, in 1978 U.S. dollars, at about $560
million, with annual production costs running at about $250 mil-
lion thereafter. 30 Recent industry studies suggest that these figures
may be conservative. 31
Further compounding the issue is the delicate supply-demand
balance in the individual metals markets themselves. For example,
deepsea mining could potentially provide up to 80 % of the world's
manganese needs, thereby further glutting the market and forcing
prices down. 32 In the copper market, vast ore deposits are ready to
go "on line" with an increase of just a few cents in price-per-
pound. 33 However, such a price increase, or unforeseen technologi-
cal breakthroughs, could trigger a switch to substitutes, such as
aluminum, stainless steel, or plastics. 34
The final economic uncertainty arises from the uncertainty of
the nodules' quality and concentration discussed above. 35 Assuming
the validity of the recent conservative AFERNOD findings, 36 Post
has reasoned as follows:
28. See, e.g., Malakoff, Polymetallic Sulfides-the Technological Challenge, SEA
TECH., Aug. 1982, at 23-28; see also U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, CIRCULAR No. 929, SYMPOSIUM
PROCEEDINGS: A NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR THE ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF TIlE UNITED
STATES EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 187, 203-04 (1984).
29. See generally A. POST, supra note 10, at 29-31; Kildow & Dar, Introduction to an
Unusual Resource Management Problem, in DEEPSEA MINING 3, 28 (J. Kildow ed. 1980).
30. The M.I.T. economic model is discussed in Antrim & Sebenis, Incentivesfor Ocean
Mining Under the Convention, in LAW OF THE SEA 79, 83-85 (B. Oxman, D. Caron & C.
Budderi eds. 1983).
31. See A. POST, supra note 10, at 209-10; Gillis, Exploration for and Exploitation of
Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources: A Deep Seabed Mining Industry Perspective, in
PROCEEDINGS OF TIlE CONFERENCE ON DEEP SEABED MINING AND FREEDOMS OF TIlE SEAS 44, 45
(F. Chen ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS OF TIlE CONFERENCE].
32. See, e.g., A. POST, supra note 10, at 50-51.
33. ARTIIUR D. LITTLE, INC., TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF MANGA-
NESE NODULE MINING AND PROCESSING 100 (Nov. 1979) (prepared for U.S. Dep't of the
Interior, Off. of Minerals Poly & Research Analysis).
34. See A. POST, supra note 10, at 54.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
36. See supra note 21.
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It would seem . . . that there are enough nodules for 33,333
• . . nodule mining project years. Polymetallic nodules, how-
ever, occur only infrequently in concentrations that can be de-
fined as economically feasible, i.e., 10 kg. per ml with combined
ore content of 2.6% nickel, copper, and cobalt. In terms of
sufficient concentration, according to AFERNOD, there are
only an estimated 1 billion tons of nodules that are worthy of
exploitation. With an efficiency rate of 20 %, 200 million tons of
nodules could be ultimately recovered, or enough for sixty-seven
mining project years, or approximately six sites covering 50,000
km 2 of rough terrain each. There are already six private mining
consortia. If there are no new operators (including international
Authority ones) and if the above estimates are accurate, then
each mining group would invest US $1 billion or more to recover
. . . 66,000 pounds of metal in 11 years.
37
Of course, assuming the validity of the general industry perception
that there are at least 400 mining project years' worth of recover-
able nodules, the above figures would be quintupled. Assuming an
80% rate of recovery could technologically be achieved, those fig-
ures could be quadrupled. Should commercial production of nod-
ules with less than a 2.6 % combined content of nickel, copper, and
cobalt become viable,3 8 those figures again could be multiplied. In
any case, probably the most reasonable conclusion to draw is that
the economics of seabed mining are uncertain, a fact stressed by
Ambassador Clingan in explaining the U.S. decision to refrain from
signing UNCLOS. 31
II. THE UNCLOS SEABED REGIME
UNCLOS will enter into force for its parties 40 twelve months
after the sixtieth ratification or accession has occurred. 41 United
States commentary to the 1981 version of the proposed treaty 42
illuminated some of the faults perceived therein by the Reagan
37. A. PosT, supra note 10, at viii.
38. See, e.g., id. at 17.
39. See Statement by Ambassador Thomas Clingan at the Final Session of UNCLOS III,
reprinted in LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, REPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE
THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 665-67 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Clingan Statement].
40. See UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 1(2), 306, 307, 311.
41. Id. art 308(1).
42. See Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doe. A/Conf.62/L.78 (1981).
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administration. On April 28, 1981, James Malone, then Assistant
Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs, commented before Congress on the Draft Con-
vention's informal text 43 as follows:
(1) The draft convention places under burdensome interna-
tional regulation the development of all of the resources of the
seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion ....
(2) [It would] establish a supranational mining company,
called the Enterprise, which would benefit from significant dis-
criminatory advantages relative to the companies of industrial-
ized countries .... Moreover, [it] requires the United States and
other nations to fund the initial capitalization of the Enterprise,
in proportion to their contributions to the United Nations.
(3) [It] compels the sale of proprietary information and
technology now largely in U.S. hands ...
(4) [It] limits the annual production of manganese nod-
ules . . . for the first 20 years of production ...
(5) [It] creates a one-nation/one-vote international organi-
zation which is governed by an assembly and a 36-member
executive council. In the council, the Soviet Union and its allies
have three guaranteed seats, but the United States must compete
with its allies for any representation. The assembly is character-
ized as the supreme organ [of the proposed International Seabed
Authority] and the specific policy decisions of the council must
conform to the general policies of the assembly.
(7) [It] imposes revenue-sharing obligations on seabed min-
ing corporations which would substantially increase the cost of
[sic] operations.
(8) It imposes an international revenue-sharing obligation
on the production of hydrocarbons from the Continental Shelf
beyond the 200 nautical mile limit ...
(9) [It] contains provisions concerning liberation move-
ments, like the PLO, and their eligibility to obtain a share of the
revenues of the Seabed Authority.
(10) [It] lacks any provisions for protecting investments
made prior to entry into force of the Convention.
44
43. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/C.62/WP.10/Rev.3 (1980),
reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1131 (1980) (informal text) (predecessor to UNCLOS, supra note 1).
44. Law of the Sea-Tenth Session: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography
of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, reprinted in Oceanography Miscel-
laenous-Part I: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on
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Since many of these objections persist despite subsequent
changes in the text, 45 and since a narrative summary of the Draft
Convention's 46 provisions exists elsewhere in the literature, 47 this
section of the Article will deal with the major objections raised by
the United States on an issue-by-issue basis, detailing the changes
between the Draft Convention and the final Convention where
appropriate. Pursuant to this objective, six general objections may
be identified and analyzed: the very existence of "common heri-
tage" (i.e., nonfree enterprise) principles; the existence of a "paral-
lel system" of exploitation (i.e., an International Enterprise); a
general deterrent effect upon development; financial obligations on
UNCLOS' ratifying states; potential revenue sharing with national
liberation movements; and the possibility that future amendments
to UNCLOS might become opposable to the United States without
its consent. These objections, and the corresponding UNCLOS pro-
visions, may now be examined in detail.
A. Nonfree enterprise Principles
Historically, after the demise of the closed seas (mare clausam)
doctrine in the early seventeenth century, 48 the free seas (mare
liberum) principle, which gave wide latitude to entrepreneurial
ventures beyond the territorial seas, controlled the oceans. Pursuant
to this customary legal norm, states were precluded from making
sovereign high seas claims, permitted free access to the high seas for
navigational, fishing, and other purposes, 49 and required to exercise
these freedoms with reasonable regard for the interests of other
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 633, 634, 636-37 (1981) (statement of
James L. Malone, Ass't Sec'y of State Designate for Oceans and Int'l Envtl. and Sci. Aff.)
(available on microfiche CIS 81, abstract no. H561-21, pt. 7 of 7) [hereinafter cited as 1981
Malone Statement].
45. See, e.g., infra note 116; text accompanying notes 132-51, 189-94.
46. See supra note 42.
47. Arrow, Prospective Impacts, supra note 10, passim.
48. During this historical period, and possibly to some extent at the present time, the
territorial seas were limited to three miles, the distance which cannon shots could effectively
control. See, e.g., Walker, Territorial Waters: the Cannon Shot Rule, 1945 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 210, 213-22; see also infra text accompanying notes 406-09 (United States presents High
Seas position and the UNCLOS straits provisions).
49. The breadth of permissive, nonexclusive uses is a necessary result of the "absence of
presumed limitations" approach, later recognized, inter alia, in S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.),
1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 19 (Judgment of Sept. 7), and in the High Seas Convention,
supra note 3, art. 2.
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states wishing to do the same. 50 That the same principles were
historically perceived as applicable to seabeds beyond the territorial
sea is evidenced, inter alia, by the fact that all exclusive claims to
such areas (prior to the universal recognition of continental shelf
rights in the early 1950's) have been specially justified by reference
to adjacency and historic rights. 5' The "freedom of the seabeds"
approach finds further support in the 1955 Report of the Interna-
tional Law Commission, 52 which commented that
[t]he list of freedoms of the high seas contained in [article 2 of
the then-proposed Convention on the High Seas] ... is not
restrictive; the Commission has merely specified four of the
main freedoms. It is aware of the fact that there are other
freedoms, such as the freedom to explore or exploit the subsoil of
the high seas and the freedom to engage in scientific research
therein. 53
On August 17, 1967, Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta, citing
the economic value of the nodules and what were then perceived to
be 'commercially exploitable gold and silver-rich muds and brines
on the Red Sea floor, first proposed in a speech to the Political
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly that the seabed
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction be deemed the "common
heritage of mankind." 5 4 At the beginning of the 24th General As-
sembly session in 1969, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) proposed the "common
heritage" principle to the Assembly. 55 The Assembly reached con-
sensus on the preclusion of sovereign claims 56 (which were probably
already prohibited in any case 57), but failed to reach agreement on
the common heritage designation 8 due to the strenuous objections
of the western maritime powers and the Soviet bloc.5 9 The develop-
50. See, e.g., M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 4, at 83 n.185, 85, 691-93, 758.
51. See Arrow, The Customary Norm Process and the Deep Seabed, 9 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 1, 13-15 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Arrow, Customary Norm]; Arrow, The Pro-
posed Regime, supra note 4, at 357-58.
52. [1955] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955.
53. Id.
54. U.N. Doc. A/6695, at 2 (1967).
55. See 24 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1673d mtg.) at 21-22, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1673 (1969).
56. See 1969 Report of the Legal Sub-Committee of the Sea-Bed Committee, 24 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 22) paras. 86, 88, 91, 96, U.N. Doc. A/7622 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
1969 Sea-Bed Committee Report].
57. See supra text accompanying note 51.
58. See 1969 Sea-Bed Committee Report, supra note 56, para. 88.
59. The United States' objections may be found in U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC.I/SR. 1-4, at
11 (1971). The Soviet Union maintained that the "seamless" nature of international law,
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ing states responded that December by forcing the so-called "Mora-
torium Resolution"60 through the General Assembly by a 62-28
vote, with 28 states abstaining and 8 not voting. This resolution,
which purported to destroy the seabed mining freedom, was re-
jected by the major powers and many others as the declaration of a
mere "paper majority." 6' In fact, the 62 positive votes did not even
constitute a majority. The resolution has undoubtedly had no effect
on the development of customary international law. 2 Nevertheless,
the stage for ideological confrontation was set.
One year later, the confrontation was papered over by the
General Assembly, which, by a vote of 108-0, with 14 abstentions,6 3
passed a resolution entitled Declaration of Principles Governing
The Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond
the Limits of National Jurisdiction6 4 (Declaration of Principles).
The Declaration of Principles contains five major principles rele-
vant for the purposes of this article: first, it applies the "common
heritage" label to both the seabed area and its resources; 65 second,
it contains a general prohibition of sovereign claims to or appropri-
ation of the seabed, 6 but not its resources;6 7 third, it precludes
resource claims inconsistent with an international regime to be
established, which is to be of a "universal character, generally
agreed upon";68 fourth, it specifies that the "common heritage"
reflected in the freedom of the seas doctrine, obviated the need to create a new legal regime.
Id. at 26-27. Japan contended that seabed mineral recovery was not prohibited by customary
international law, and that the "common heritage" designation might obfuscate that point.
Id. at 29.
60. G.A. Res. 2574, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969),
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 422 (1970).
61. See 24 U.N. CAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 6-11, Doc. A/PV.1833 (prov. ed. 1969).
62. See, e.g., Arrow, The Proposed Regime, supra note 4, at 368-77.
63. 25 U.N. GAOR (1933d plen. mtg.) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/P.V.1933 (1970). The
United States voted in favor; the Soviet Union abstained. Id, at 20.
64. G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Declaration of Principles].
65. Id. para. 1.
66. Id. para. 2.
67. Id, It is especially noteworthy that while the Declaration of Principles recalled G.A.
Res. 2467, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/Res. 2467 (1969), reprinted in
8 I.L.M. 201, 205 (1969) (providing that the seabed should be used for the benefit of mankind
as a whole and for peaceful purposes), it did not recall the Moratorium Resolution. See
Declaration of Principles, supra note 64, preamble. Had it attempted such a preclusion,
opposition similar to that encountered by the Moratorium Resolution one year previously
would have been highly likely. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
68. Declaration of Principles, supra note 64, paras. 3, 4, 9. See also infra note 225.
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principle requires that exploitation be carried out "for the benefit of
mankind as a whole, . . . taking into particular consideration the
interests and needs of the developing countries";6 1 and fifth, it
precludes resource claims inconsistent with the common heritage
"principles of this Declaration."'70
Given the stridency of the subsequent United States reaffirma-
tions of its free-enterprise principles, two observations concerning
its support for the Declaration of Principles may be made. First, the
resolution was presented as a political, rather than a legal docu-
ment. In a lengthy statement to the First Committee, Galindo-
Pohl, Chairman of the Legal Sub-Committee, explained that the
draft "is not and is not intended to be a provisional regime govern-
ing the exploitation of the seabed. . . .[The draft] was accepted by
all parties independent of the positions they may have taken on the
problems of maritime law. '"71
Second, although the text did require that particular consider-
ation be given to "the interests and needs of the developing coun-
tries" 72, the nature of that consideration, and all other manifesta-
tions of the common heritage principle, were left unclear. Thus, the
United States was able to later maintain (especially in light of the
wildly divergent interpretations of the common heritage principle
advanced from the time of its adoption to the current date73) that
the Declaration was essentially an agreement to agree:
[T]he United States supported (by affirmative vote) the United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV) declaring in-
ter alia the principle that the mineral resources of the deep sea-
bed are the common heritage of mankind, with the expectation
that this principle would be legally defined under the terms of a
comprehensive international Law of the Sea Treaty yet to be
agreed upon. 74
69. Declaration of Principles, supra note 64, paras. 7, 9.
70. Id. para. 3.
71. 25 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1781st mtg.) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1781 (1970) (emphasis
added). Numerous delegations also echoed similar sentiments in statements explaining their
votes. See, e.g., 25 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1799th mtg.) at 6, 32, U.N. Doc. A/C.I/PV.1799
(1970); 25 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1777th mtg.) at 27, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1777 (1970).
72. Declaration of Principles, supra note 64, para. 7.
73. Some of these are summarized in Arrow, The Customary Norm, supra note 51, at
28-38. See also Shingleton, UNCLOS III and the Struggle for Law: the Elusive Customary
Law of Seabed Mining, 13 OCEAN DEV. AND INT'L L. 33, 55 (1983).
74. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 96-283, § 2(a)(7), 94 Stat.
553 (1980) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (Supp. IV 1980)), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1003
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Steven Gorove made an even broader argument in 1972:
[T]he reference to the rather elusive and undefined concept of
"common heritage of mankind," no matter how well motivated,
in a legally binding document would be unfortunate unless it is
realized from the outset that it carries no clear juridical connota-
tion but belongs to the realm of politics, philosophy, or moral-
ity, and not law. This is not to say that philosophers, politicians,
or moralists would necessarily be in a better position to give a
rational explanation of the meaning of the phrase. 75
Nevertheless, from a contemporary perspective, it may be con-
ceded that, to the extent that UNCLOS has or will develop interna-
tional cognizability, the legal meaning of the common heritage
principle has been defined by the detail of UNCLOS' seabed mining
provisions. 7  That detail prompted several members of the new
Reagan delegation 77 to wear Adam Smith neckties during the first
part of the 1981 Geneva negotiating session. It is that detail which
will now be more particularly addressed.
B. The "Parallel System" of Exploitation
The ideological deadlock concerning the system of seabed ex-
ploitation became excruciatingly evident at the Second Negotiating
Session of UNCLOS III in 1974, when four inconsistent drafts were
(1980) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Act]. See also Statement by Ambassador Elliot L. Richard-
son, Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference to the Plenary
Meeting (Sept. 15, 1978), reprinted in Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act: Hearings
and Markup on H.R. 2759 Before the Subcomms. on International Economic Policy and
Trade and on International Organizations of the House Comm. Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong.
2d Sess. 19-21 (1980) (explaining the United States support); T. KRONMILLER, supra note 10,
at 39, 40.
75. Gorove, The Concept of "Common Heritage of Mankind": A Political, Moral, or
Legal Innovation?, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 390, 402 (1972).
76. Interestingly, this conclusion is the functional equivalent of the approach proposed
by Belgium in 1969. In Sea-Bed Committee discussions, the Belgian delegate referred to the
common heritage concept as a neologism, which means different things to different people.
Rather than using this inherently ambiguous term, he proposed that agreement be reached on
specific issues on an item-by-item basis. See U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.1/SR.12-29, at 16
(1969). The Canadian delegate agreed. Id. at 18.
77. Concerning the delegate shuffling which occurred during the weekend of March 8,
1981, see Wertenbaker, A Reporter at Large: The Law of the Sea-I, NEW YORKER, Aug. 1,
1983, at 41-45 [hereinafter cited as Wertenbaker-I]; N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1981, at Al, col.
1. See also Ratiner, The Costs of American Rigidity, in LAW OF THE SEA 27, 28-33 (B. Oxman,
D. Caron & C. Budderi eds. 1983).
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introduced concerning that issue. 78 Although initially proposing a
system in which all exploitation was to be carried on by states or
their nationals, at the Third (Geneva) Negotiating Session in the
spring of 1975, the United States offered a compromise, proposing a
parallel system of joint ventures between the proposed Interna-
tional Seabed Authority (ISA) and state or private contracting par-
ties. The compromise provided that the half of the area to be
reserved to the Enterprise be exploited by it in conjunction with
states or their nationals on the most favorable economic and tech-
nological terms commercially available. With respect to the nonre-
served areas, over which the ISA would exercise only licensing
authority, the specific licensing provisions of the treaty would con-
trol.7 9 This compromise was ultimately rejected by the developing
states.
80
To break the resultant stalemate 8  during the Fourth (New
York) Negotiating Session of April 1976, then-Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger proposed a parallel system of exploitation 2 with
guaranteed access for United States nationals, in return for United
States guarantees that appropriate technology and financing would
be made available to the Enterprise. 83 This, of course, is more or
less84 what finally resulted-though the developing states rejected
78. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.3, at 6, 7 (1974); cf. Stevenson & Oxman, The
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session, 69 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 7-12 (1975) (discussing four alternatives for the exploitation system).
79. U.S. Delegation Report, The Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Geneva, Mar. 17-May 9, 1975, at 4 (1975); cJ. Stevenson & Oxman, supra note 78, 766-67
(discussing conciliatory efforts).
80. Stevenson & Oxman, supra note 78, at 767.
81. That the ideological differences were deep, and that the issue was unlikely to go
away, was evidenced by the release of the notorious "Engo Draft." See Report by Mr. Paul
Bamela Engo, Chairman of the First Committee on the Work of the Committee at the Fifth
Session of the Conference, Sept. 6, 1976, reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.16 (1976).
82. This system would allow both the ISA, through an "Enterprise" division, and state
or private parties to exploit the seabed area, in contrast to the "unitary" system whereby the
Enterprise-with or without participation by states or private contractors--would have the
exclusive right to exploit.
83. See Speech by Henry A. Kissinger Delivered to the Foreign Policy Association, N.Y.,
N.Y. (Apr. 8, 1976) (entitled The Law of the Sea: A Test of International Cooperation).
84. The "parallel system" is described generally in UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 153(2),
(3), (6). As to whether guaranteed access is assured to United States nationals, see infra text
accompanying notes 117-54. Regarding financing of the Enterprise, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 80-89, 181-88. Concerning transfer of technology, see infra text accompanying
notes 162-65. Concerning the specifics of licensing and functioning of the Enterprise, see,
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this plan in 1976,85 and the specifics of the final UNCLOS version
are now unacceptable to the United States.
86
The "parallel system" (permitting both private and interna-
tional development) finally adopted by UNCLOS8 7 requires each
private 88 applicant to submit a proposed work plan89 delimiting a
tract of sufficient value to permit two mining operations, and to
specify the coordinates dividing the tract into two sections of ap-
proximately equal commercial value. Within 45 to 90 days of re-
ceiving this information, the ISA is required to designate the half to
be reserved for international exploitation by the Enterprise.90 The
Enterprise then has the discretion to exploit it, maintain it in re-
serve, or assign it to a developing state or developing state nationals
for exploitation."
Upon approval of the work plan by the ISA, 9 2 the applicant is
granted exclusive exploitation rights to the nonreserved portion of
the tract.9 3 Title to the nodules passes upon their recovery in con-
formity with the terms of UNCLOS, 94 and contractual rights estab-
lished pursuant to it may not be modified without the consent of
e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 150-55, 162(2)(e), (k), 170 & Annexes 3, 4; Arrow,
Prospective Impacts, supra note 10, at 247-50; infra text accompanying notes 88-100.
85. See U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/C.1/W.R.5/Add.1 (1976).
86. See, e.g., Statement of United States Ambassador James Malone at the Plenary
Session of UNCLOS III (Apr. 30, 1982), reprinted in LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, supra note
39, at 549, 596 [hereinafter cited as Malone Statement-Apr. 1982]; cf. Malone, Who Needs
the Sea Treaty, 54 FOREIGN POL'Y 44 (1984).
87. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 153(2). Article 153 provides that activities in the area
shall be carried out as prescribed in paragraph 3:
(a) by the Enterprise, and
(b) in association with the Authority by States Parties, or state enterprises or natural
or juridical persons which possess the nationality of States Parties or are effectively
controlled by them or their nationals, when sponsored by such States, or any group
of the foregoing which meets the requirements provided in this Part and in Annex
III.
Id.
88. See id. art. 153(2)(b).
89. The nature of the required work plan is described in UNCLOS, supra note 1, art.
153(3) & Annex 3, arts. 3, 5, 6.
90. Id. Annex 3, art. 8.
91. Id. Annex 3, arts. 3(2), 9.
92. See id. arts. 153(3), 162(2)(j); injra text accompanying notes 122-23.
93. UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex 3, arts. 3(4)(c), 16.
94. Id. Annex 3, art. 1.
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both parties. 95 The duration of a diligently pursued9 6 contractual
exploitation right is indefinite. 7 The right, upon ISA approval 8
and if the UNCLOS "antimonopoly" provisions will not be vio-
lated,99 may be transferred to another qualified applicant which
accepts all prior contractual obligations. Applicants (whether ap-
plying for initial licensing or license transferral) are considered
qualified if they either are a State Party or are sponsored by a State
Party and if they follow the procedures and meet the various quali-
fication standards of UNCLOS. 10 0 Since the particulars of the quali-
fying standards lie at the heart of the United States' position that
the UNCLOS regime deters rather than promotes seabed develop-
ment, these provisions will now be more specifically examined.
C. Deterring Development
In a statement made to an UNCLOS plenary session on April
30, 1982, Ambassador James Malone, then Special Representative
of the President for the Law of the Sea, articulated the United
States' position on the UNCLOS seabed-mining framework as fol-
lows:
First, we believe the seabed mining provisions would deter
the development of deep seabed mineral resources. Economic
development of these resources is in the interest of all countries.
In a world in which rational economic development is so criti-
cal, particularly for developing countries, the treaty would cre-
ate yet another barrier to such development. It would deny the
play of basic economic forces in the market place.
Second, while there have been improvements to assure ac-
cess to deep seabed minerals for existing miners, we do not
believe that the seabed articles would provide the assured access
95. Id. arts. 153(6), 155(5) & Annex 3, arts. 16, 19(2). But see, e.g., id. arts. 153(4), (5),
160(2)(m), 162(2)(a)-(u), 185, 187(b), (c) & Annex 3, art. 18 (provisions concerning suspen-
sion or termination for breach of UNCLOS obligations).
96. The performance requirements are specified in id. Annex 3, art. 17(2)(c).
97. See id. Annex 3, art. 17(2)(b)(iii).
98. UNCLOS presumably delegates this power to the Council component of the ISA,
see id. art. 162(1), (2)(o)(ii). But see id. art. 160(2)(f)(ii). Nevertheless, it remains unclear
whether this decision is to be effected by a three-fourths affirmative vote, pursuant to
UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 162(1), (2)(a), or by the more lenient voting provisions of article
162(2)(j), id. art. 162(2)(j). Cf. infra text accompanying notes 122-23.
99. Id. Annex 3, art. 20. For a discussion of the "antimonopoly" provisions, id. Annex 3,
art. 6 (3 )(c), see infra text accompanying notes 152-61.
100. UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex 3, art. 4(1), (3). If an applicant has more than one
nationality, however, as in the case of a partnership or consortium, all state parties involved
are required to sponsor the application. Id.
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for qualified future miners that is necessary to promote the
economic development of these resources ...
Third, the decision-making process in the deep seabed re-
gime does not give a proportionate voice to those countries most
affected by the decisions and, thus, would not fairly reflect and
effectively protect their interests.
Finally, the deep seabed regime . . . creat[es] precedents
that are not appropriate. . . . [These include] mandatory trans-
fer of technology and . . . production limitations, [which] are
also key problems for the US Congress.' 0'
The UNCLOS regime's potential deterrent effect upon devel-
opment is derivative of a number of its aspects, including: the
miners' financial obligations to the ISA; the lack of guaranteed
access to potential miners resulting from UNCLOS' voting struc-
ture, production controls, and "antimonopoly" provisions; and re-
quired transfer of technology. These issues will now be examined in
turn.
1. Licensing Fees
The financial obligations to the ISA of miners in the prospect-
ing and development phase are not severe. A one-time fee, ini-
tially 0 2 fixed at U.S.$500,000, is imposed to cover the administra-
tive costs of processing the application, approving the work plan,
and issuing the contract. 103 From the date the contract enters into
force, an annual fixed fee of U.S.$1,000,000 is payable. 0 4 This fee,
however, would not be likely to have a significant deterrent effect
since the average costs for the initial research and development
phase have run in excess of U.S.$30,000,000. Expenses in the subse-
quent "prototype" or "demonstration" phase are likely to approach
an additional U.S.$100,000,000, and total pre-production expenses
have been variously estimated at between U.S.$560,000,000 and
U. S. $750,000,000.105
101. Malone Statement, Apr. 1982, supra note 86, at 594, 596-97. See also Clingan
Statement, supra note 39, at 666 (summary of United States position).
102. This fee is adjustable in either direction based on actual license-processing costs.
UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex 3, art. 13(2).
103. Id.
104. Id. Annex 3, art. 13(3).
105. See generally A. PosT, supra note 10, at 19, 20 (detailing the various dollar
amounts).
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Miners' financial obligations to the ISA during the commercial
recovery phase are substantially more significant. From the date of
commencement of commercial production, the contractor is re-
quired to pay either a production charge0 6 or the annual fixed
fee, 10 7 whichever is greater. Within a year thereafter, contractors
are required to elect whether to make their financial contributions
to the ISA by paying a production charge only, or by paying a
combination of the production charge and a share of net pro-
ceeds. 108 The ISA's share of the attributable net proceeds (pursuant
to the "combination" fee system) is contingent upon the level of net
proceeds realized. During the first period of commercial produc-
tion, 10 9 the ISA share is 35% of the first 10% of net proceeds,
4.2.5% of the second 10%, and 50% of any net proceeds represent-
ing a return on investment which is 20% or greater. During the
second period of commercial production, 10 the ISA shares are
106. See infra text accompanying note 108.
107. See supra text accompanying note 104.
108. UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex 3, art. 13(4).
If a contractor decides to pay a production charge only, it is fixed at 5% of the market
value of the metals produced for the first ten years of commercial production, and 12%
thereaker. Id. Annex 3, art. 13(5). If the contractor elects to pay the "combination" fee, the
production charge is fixed at 2% of the market value of the metals for the "first period of
commercial production." Id. Annex 3, art. 13(6). This term is defined in UNCLOS:
The first period of commercial production shall commence in the first account-
ing year of commercial production and terminate in the accounting year in which
the contractor's development costs with interest on the unrecovered portion thereof
are fully recovered by his cash surplus, as follows: In the first accounting year
during which development costs are incurred, unrecovered development costs shall
equal the development costs less cash surplus in that year. In each subsequent
accounting year, unrecovered development costs shall equal the unrecovered devel-
opment costs at the end of the preceding accounting year, plus interest thereon at
the rate of 10 per cent per annum, plus development costs incurred in the current
accounting year and less contractor's cash surplus in the current accounting year.
The accounting year in which unrecovered development costs become zero for the
first time shall be the accounting year in which the contractor's development costs
with interest on the unrecovered portion thereof are fully recovered by his cash
surplus. The contractor's cash surplus in any accounting year shall be his gross
proceeds less his operating costs and less his payments to the Authority under
subparagraph (c).
Id. Annex 3, art. 13(6)(d)(i). Four percent is paid thereafter, id. Annex 3, art. 13(6)(a),
unless, during the subsequent period, return on investment in any accounting year falls below
15% as a result of the payment of the production charge, in which case the two percent
figure would revert for that accounting year. Id. Annex 3, art. 13(6).
109. See supra note 108.
110. "The second period of commercial production shall commence in the accounting
year following the termination of the first period of commercial production and shall con-
tinue until the end of the contract." UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex 3, art. 13(6)(d)(ii).
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40%, 50%, and 70%, respectively. 1" These obligations to the ISA
during the commercial recovery stage could significantly deter min-
ing, due to the inherently speculative nature of the venture, and to
the fact that economic profitability over a twenty-year projected
life-span has been generally estimated at between 812 % and 15%,
before any potential ISA contributions are considered.
2. Guaranteed Access
Lack of guaranteed access to the nodules has also been sug-
gested to have a potentially serious deterrent effect upon seabed
investors and miners. While the UNCLOS access and licensing
system is complex, the primary provisions which affect this issue
concern the voting and governance system of the ISA, production
controls, and "antimonopoly" requirements related to licensing.
While the ISA Assembly, composed of all ISA members on a
one-nation, one-vote basis," 2 is designated the "supreme" ISA or-
gan, 113 its powers are narrowly limited by specific UNCLOS guide-
lines, 1 4 and by the requirement, in many cases, of a recommenda-
tion from the Council prior to Assembly action." 5 The election of
the thirty-six Council members, while delegated to the Assembly, is
to be conducted in accordance with an elaborate seat-allocation
formula." 6 As a result of this formula, the Soviet bloc could expect
111. Id. Annex 3, art. 13(6)(c).
112. Id. art. 159(1), (6).
113. Id. art. 160(1).
114. For examples of this type of discretion limitation, see id. art. 160(2)(a), (e), (g),
(in).
115. See, e.g., id. art. 160(1), (2)(b), (c), (f), (h).
116. Concerning the evolution of this formula at the final UNCLOS session, see Werten-
baker, A Reporter at Large: The Law of the Sea-l, NEW YORKEFI, Aug. 8, 1983, at 56, 58-60
[hereinafter cited as Wertenbaker-II]
First, four members are to be elected from the group of states which has either consumed
more than two percent of world consumption, or imported more than two percent of world
imports. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 161(1)(a). In any case, the selection is to include at
least one Eastern European (Socialist) state, and the largest consumer state (the United
States, if it were to ratify UNCLOS). Id. Second, four states are to be selected from the group
having the largest investments in seabed mining (either directly or through their nationals),
including at least one Eastern European (Socialist) state. Id. art. 161(1)(b). Third, four
members are to be elected from the group of major exporters of the metals involved. Id. art.
161(c). This includes at least two developing states whose exports of such metals have a
substantial effect on their economies. Id. Fourth, six developing states are to be chosen with
special reference to population, geographic disadvantage, metal imports, potential produc-
tion, and relative degree of poverty. Id. art. 161(1)(d). Finally, the remaining 18 seats are to
be filled on the basis of geographic distribution, including at least one state from each region
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to get at least three seats; 17 the United States would be guaranteed
a "consumer" 1 8 seat; Canada would almost certainly occupy an
"exporter"119 seat; other western powers would fill the remaining
two "consumer"'1 20 seats and probably two or three "geographic
distribution"' 12 1 seats; with the developing states likely occupying
the remaining twenty-three or twenty-four seats. While it would
appear that this voting configuration could preclude secure seabed
access by United States nationals, it must be noted that a work plan
approved by the Legal and Technical Commission 22 is deemed
approved "unless the Council disapproves it by consensus among its
members excluding any State or States making the application or
sponsoring the applicant." 123 Thus, while guaranteed access might
not materialize for other reasons, the ISA voting procedures present
no inherent, insurmountable obstacle to it.
UNCLOS incorporates a system of production controls which
has also been suggested to exert a significant deterrent effect on
development. During an "interim period,"1 24 a production ceiling,
keyed to the production of nickel, is established.125 Some such
recognized by the United Nations. Id. art. 161(1)(e). The five UN-recognized geographic
regions are: Africa, Asia, Eastern European (Socialist), Latin America, Western Europe and
Others (this last group includes the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan). Id.
117. The Soviet bloc is guaranteed a "consumer" seat, id. art. 161(1)(a), an "investor"
seat, id. art. 161(1)(e), and a "geographic distribution" seat, id. art. 161(1)(e).
118. For the relevant treaty provision, see id. art. 161(1)(a).
119. For the relevant treaty provision, see id. art. 161(1)(c).
120. For the relevant treaty provision, see id. art. 161(1)(a).
121. For the relevant treaty provision, see id. art. 161(1)(e).
122. This 15 member subordinate Council organ will be selected by a three-fourths vote
of the Council, and will base its recommendations exclusively on the criteria provided in
UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex 3. See id. arts. 161(8)(c), 163(2), 165(1), 2(b). See also id.
Annex 3, arts. 4-8, 10, 14, 17 (procedure and rules concerning applicants for production
authorizations). The 9 or 10 seats likely to be held by western powers should be sufficient to
prevent "unacceptable" persons from being selected to membership in the Legal and Techni-
cal Commission. For the relevant treaty provision, see id. art. 161(1).
123. Id. art. 162(2)(i), (j).
124. An "interim period" may be generally defined as including the five years prior to
commercial production and the first twenty years thereof, unless the Review Conference is
concluded at an earlier date. See id. art. 151(3). The Review Conference provisions are
contained in article 155. Id. art. 155. For a discussion of such provisions, see injra text
accompanying notes 211-17.
125. See UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 151(4). Assuming the existence of reasonable
increases in consumption, the nickel ceiling will be the sum of: (1) the difference between the
trend line values for nickel consumption for the year prior to the earliest commercial
production and the year prior to the beginning of the interim period, and (2) 60% of the
difference between the trend line values for nickel consumption for the year in which the
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system was perceived necessary in order to avoid both severe dis-
ruption of the economies of the metal exporting states and to pre-
clude precipitous drops in metal prices (which might be the ulti-
mate deterrent to continued mining). From the standpoint of the
United States and other consuming countries, the formula finally
adopted has been described as "without bite,"1 26 and further ana-
lyzed not as an "attack on free enterprise .. . .[but rather as] a
trade agreement between the United States and Canada-that is,
between the largest consumer of nickel and the largest producer of
it." 2 7
The cumulative production ceiling, however, is not the only
production limitation. UNCLOS' provisions also reserve to the En-
terprise, for its initial production, the first 38,000 tons of nickel
from the total available to be produced. 128 The deterrent effect of
this provision depends upon the total quantity of nodules available
for exploitation. If the AFERNOD estimates 29 are correct, then the
total 200,000,000 tons of nodules commercially recoverable could
be expected to produce only about two million tons of nickel in
twenty years, 130 or about 100,000 tons a year. Reservation to the
Enterprise of the first 38,000 tons under these conditions might well
inhibit private sector recovery. Should the more optimistic esti-
mates of supply13 prove accurate, the deterrent effect of the reser-
vation would correspondingly be diminished.
In concluding the access issue, it must be noted that the Final
Act 32 of UNCLOS III appends a resolution 33 (Resolution II),
agreed to at the 1982 Eleventh (New York) Negotiating Session,
production authorization is being sought and the year prior to the earliest commercial
production. Id. art. 151(4)(a), (b). The ceiling for the other metals likely to be produced
"should" not be higher than those which would have been produced had the maximum
permissible level of nickel been produced. Id. art. 151(7).
126. See Wertenbaker-II, supra note 116, at 73 (quoting Leigh Ratiner, Chief Deputy
to United States Ambassador Malone).
127. Id.
128. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 151(5).
129. See supra note 21.
130. The average nickel content of the nodules examined thus far is 0.6% to 1.36%. See
A. POST, supra note 10, at 16.
131. See, e.g., R. ECKERT, THE ENCLOSURE OF OCEAN RESOURcEs 215 (1979); T. KRON-
MILLER, supra note 10, at 457; Alexander, supra note 18, at 1, col. 2; Hawkins, Reaffirming
Freedom of the Seas, FREEMAN, Mar. 1982, at 182.
132. See supra note 5.
133. Final Act, supra note 5, annex 1, Resolution II [hereinafter cited as Resolution II].
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which provides a modicum of guaranteed access to "pioneer" inves-
tors. 134 Pursuant to Resolution II, any signatory state may apply to
the Preparatory Commission 135 on behalf of itself, its nationals, or
entities controlled thereby, for registration as a pioneer investor. 3 '
134. See id. para. 6. "Pioneer investors" include France, India, Japan, and the USSR, or
state enterprises thereof, provided that said states or their enterprises have invested at least 30
million 1982 U.S. dollars in pioneer activities prior to January 1, 1983, and provided that no
less than 10% of that amount was expended in the location, survey, and evaluation of the
area sought to be reserved by them. Id. para. (1)(a)(i). The major consortia, supra note 23,
also qualify for pioneer investor status, provided that the certifying state or states sign
UNCLOS, and provided further that they meet the minimum investment requirement
described above. Any developing state, state enterprise, or national (or national which is
effectively controlled by the state), may qualify for pioneer status provided that it meets the
minimum investment requirements by January 1, 1985. Resolution II, supra note 133, para.
(1)(a)(iii). See Sea-Bed Mineral Resource Development: Recent Activities of the International
Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/107 (1980); U.N.
Doc. ST/ESA/107/Add.1 (1982), cited in Resolution II, supra note 133, para. 1(a)(ii). Con-
cerning the nature of state sponsorship of private mining organizations and consortia, UN-
CLOS, supra note 1, Annex 3, art. 4(3), provides that:
Each applicant shall be sponsored by the State Party of which it is a national
unless the applicant has more than one nationality, as in the case of a partnership or
consortium . . . , in which event all States Parties involved shall sponsor the appli-
cation, or unless the applicant is effectively controlled by another State Party or its
nationals, in which event both States Parties shall sponsor the application.
Id. UNCLOS further requires that private developers either possess the nationality of, or are
effectively controlled by, states parties. Id. art. 153 (2)(b). In the regular (i.e. nonpioneer)
licensing phase, however, the major consortia could, if they so chose, qualify pursuant to the
UNCLOS regime despite U.S. nonparticipation therein. OMA, 50% of which is held by U.S.
corporations, could, for example, qualify by substituting corporate for partnership form, and
incorporating in, for example, Belgium or Italy. OMCO could do the same by incorporating
in the Netherlands. OMI could reincorporate in Canada, Japan, or the Federal Republic of
Germany (were it to ratify), and the Kennecott group, controlled by the United Kingdom,
could qualify under UNCLOS' "effective control" provisions (again, assuming United King-
dom ratification of UNCLOS).
However, during the pioneer licensing phase, such action is precluded pursuant to
Resolution II, supra note 133, para. 8(c), which provides that no plan shall be approved, in
the case of private pioneer investors, "'unless all the States whose natural or juridical persons
comprise those entities are Parties to the Convention." Id. (emphasis added). Although a
potential loophole might be found even here due to the absence of an "effective control"
provision (such a loophole could be exploited most effectively through the creation of foreign
subsidiaries), none of the major U.S. participants has yet exhibited much enthusiasm about
operating under the UNCLOS regime. But cf. Resolution II, supra note 133, para. 10 (does
not literally preclude the above result).
Resolution II is to have the same legal effect as if it were incorporated within the text of
UNCLOS itself. Id. para. 13; Final Act, supra note 5, para. 42.
135. See generally Final Act, supra note 5, annex 1, Resolution I (establishing the
Preparatory Commission) [hereinafter cited as Resolution I]; infra text accompanying notes
441-56, 462 (discussing the Preparatory Commission).
136. Resolution 11, supra note 133, para. 2.
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Applicants are required to apply for one pioneer area only,' 37 of
150,000 square kilometers or less,' 38 which need not be a single
contiguous area, and which is of sufficient size and value to permit
two mining operations.' 39 Within forty-five days of receiving ap-
propriate documentation, the Preparatory Commission is required
to designate the half to be reserved to the Enterprise (or developing
states), 140 with the remainder allocated to the investor as a pioneer
area.' 4' Within six months of certification of the pioneer applicant's
area by the Preparatory Commission (provided that UNCLOS is in
force),' 4 2 pioneer investors are required to apply to the ISA for work
plan approval, which the ISA is directed to grant if the plan com-
ports with the normal licensing requirements of UNCLOS, Annex
111.143 The otherwise apposite production control,' 44 antimonop-
oly,' 45 and transfer of technology' 4  requirements still obtain,' 47 and
pioneer-status applicants are required to pay an initial
U.S.$250,000 application fee to the Preparatory Commission, an-
other U.S.$250,000 when the work plan is submitted, and an an-
nual fixed fee of U.S.$1,000,000 commencing with the date on
which the pioneer area is allocated by the ISA. 48 Having guaran-
teed pioneer investors access to one mine site, however, Resolution
II requires the investor to relinquish at least 50% of its area to
revert back to unreserved status prior to production. 49
137. Id. para. 4.
138. Id. para. 1(e).
139. Id. para. 3(a).
140. Id. para. 3(b). But see supra text accompanying notes 90-91 (regular, i.e. non-
pioneer, licensing provisions).
141. Resolution II, supra note 133, paras. 3(b), 6. The parties are required to resolve
conflicting pioneer applications by binding arbitration, if necessary, evaluating the time,
quality, continuity, and cost of the pioneer activities involved. Id. para. 5. The Preparatory
Commission is required to register the investor's pioneer status upon certification of the
requisite investment by the applying or sponsoring state or states and upon its finding that
such application comports with all other requirements of Resolution II, provided that all area
conflicts are resolved by December 1, 1984. Id. paras. 2, 5(c). Concerning the nature of the
requisite investment, see supra note 134.
142. See supra text accompanying note 41.
143. Resolution II, supra note 133, para. 8.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 124-28.
145. See infra text accompanying notes 153-61.
146. See infra text accompanying notes 162-75.
147. See Resolution II, supra note 133, paras. 9, 12(a), 15.
148. Id. para. 7.
149. Id. para. l(e). Twenty percent of the pioneer area is to revert back by the end of
the third year after allocation; an additional 10 % two years thereafter; and the final 20 % "or
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The inducement to development created by Resolution II's
''guaranteed access" provisions has not been significant thus far.
While only the four major consortia' i 0 are qualified to apply for
pioneer status by virtue of the terms of Resolution 1,151 none of
them has yet applied or is likely to do so.
The final potential deterrent to seabed mining development
arises from UNCLOS' "antimonopoly" provisions. These provisions
preclude a state or its nationals from exploiting nonreserved 152
tracts which collectively exceed "30 per cent of a circular area of
400,000 square kilometres surrounding the centre of either part of
the area covered by the proposed plan of work .. . [or] which,
taken together, constitute 2 per cent of the total sea-bed area which
is not reserved or disapproved for exploitation." 15 3 For purposes of
applying the antimonopoly provisions, work plans are to be
counted on a pro rata basis among the sponsoring states.15 4
Compounding the problems of the direct geographical limita-
tions, Annex 3 of UNCLOS provides that where selection among
applicants is required because of production limitations, 5 5 selection
criteria are to include "the need to enhance opportunities for all
States Parties, irrespective of their social and economic systems...
so as to avoid discrimination against any State or system, to partici-
pate in activities in the Area and to prevent monopolization of those
activities."' This provision, coupled with the ability of the Enter-
prise to apply in its own right for licensing in any part of the
Area, 57 presents a twofold problem. The ISA is provided with
grounds for refusing production authorizations to United States
such larger amount as would exceed the exploitation area decided upon by the Authority in
its rules, regulations, and procedures" three years thereafter, but in no case after the date of
the award of a production authorization. Id.
150. See supra note 23.
151. Resolution II, supra note 133, para. l(a)(ii); see also supra note 134.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
153. UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex 3, art. 6(3)(c). Nonreserved areas may be disap-
proved for exploitation by a three-fourths vote of the Council, id. art. 161(8)(c), where there
is substantial evidence indicating a risk of "serious harm to the marine environment." Id. art.
162 (2)(x). See also id. arts. 161(8)(c), 165(2)(d) (concerning Council decisions on questions of
substance, and the Legal and Technical Commission's preparation of environmental impact
assessments).
154. Id. Annex 3, art. 4.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 124-30.
156. UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex 3, art. 7(5) (emphasis added).
157. See supra text accompanying note 91.
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miners (or, for that matter, miners whose nationality was of states
with similar "systems" 58) and could also call into force Enterprise
priority rights pursuant to the production ceilings described
above."15 Moreover, by precluding monopolist behavior by nation-
als of a state (or states with similar "systems"), the antimonopoly
provisions could encourage effective monopolization by the Enter-
prise. 160
All this has prompted the President's Special Representative to
UNCLOS III to include in his list of objections to UNCLOS "[t]he
limit on the number of mining operations which could be con-
ducted by any one country, thus potentially limiting our ability to
supply U.S. consumption needs from the seabed."' 6'1  While the
actual deterrent effect of the antimonopoly provisions on mining
cannot be foretold with certainty prior to their interpretation by
the ISA Council, their expansive language has likely already con-
tributed to second thoughts among potential investors.
3. Transfer-of-Technology Requirements
As has been indicated, the essence of the amorphous principle
that the seabeds are the "common heritage of mankind"16 2 may be
found in the detail of UNCLOS ' 3 -to the extent that it has or will
develop international legal cognizability. The UNCLOS require-
ment that license grantees transfer their seabed mining technology
to the Enterprise 64 and developing state applicants'6 5 on "fair and
reasonable commercial terms and conditions"' 66 is another pro-
158. See supra text accompanying note 156.
159. See A. POST, supra note 10, at 205. For a discussion of the production ceilings, see
supra text accompanying notes 124-49.
160. See A. POST, supra note 10, at 205.
161. Statement of Ambassador James Malone, Special Representative of the President
for the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, before the House Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Committee (Feb. 23, 1982), reprinted in LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE,
supra note 39, at 556, 557 [hereinafter cited as Malone Statement-Feb. 1982].
162. See supra text accompanying notes 55-75.
163. See supra text accompanying note 76.
164. See UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex 3, art. 5(3)(a). Technology, not generally
available on reasonable terms, which the licensee does not wish, or is not legally entitled, to
transfer may not be used in carrying out its activities in exploring or exploiting the seabed
area. Id. Annex 3, art. 5(3)(b).
165. See id. Annex 3, art. 5(3)(e).
166. Id. Annex 3, art. 5(3)(a).
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fication of the "common heritage" principle. 16 7 The requirement
only applies if the Enterprise finds that it is unable to obtain the
same or equally efficient technology on the open market on fair and
reasonable terms. 8 Whether a proposed licensee's terms and condi-
tions are "fair and reasonable" is subject to binding arbitration at
the insistence of either party. 6 9
While most seabed mining technology is already commercially
available, 7 0 the general industry perception is that requiring the
transfer, on terms not under the developer's control, is an unreason-
able demand on those whose time, energy, and expense have cre-
ated it. Moreover, such required transfers could diminish the com-
petitive edge of developers of new and more efficient technology,
reducing the inducement to further technological advancement,
and producing a concomitant levelling effect on the industry as a
whole. ' 7' Even should the prospective sale of newly developed tech-
nology on "fair and reasonable terms" and the miner's increased
profitability resulting from maximized technological efficiency fur-
nish ample motivation for future research and development, com-
pulsory transfer on terms outside the developer's control has con-
tributed incrementally to the industry perception concerning the
unattractiveness of the UNCLOS regime.
Finally, from a national (as opposed to a mining industry)
perspective, it must be noted that at least some seabed mining
technology is capable of diversion to military uses.172 While UN-
CLOS contains provisions which purport to prohibit transfer of
acquired technology to third states or their nationals, 73 such limita-
tions do not bind the Enterprise, 74 and would practically be unen-
167. See id. arts. 140(1), 144, 150(d), 266-278 & Annex 3, arts. 4(6)(d), 5 (other
amplifications of the "common heritage" principle in the context of technology transfer).
168. Id. Annex 3, art. 5(3)(a).
169. Id. Annex 3, art. 5(4).
170. Wertenbaker-II, supra note 116, at 77; see generally A. PosT, supra note 10, at
22-23 (discussing nodule mining uncertainties).
171. See, e.g., Marshall, Law of the Sea and the New U.S. Oceans Policy, 55 N.Y. ST.
BAR J. 8, 12 (1983).
172. In 1975, for example, the Hughes-built Glomar Explorer demonstrated that, in
addition to its potential for nodule-mining, it was capable of recovering at least part of a
Soviet nuclear-powered submarine from the deep ocean floor. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 19,
1975, at Al, col. 8.
173. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 267 & Annex 3, art. 5(3)(e).
174. Id. Annex 3, arts. 5(3)(d), 14(3).
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forceable in light of the numerous inspection, verification, and on-
ship training requirements contained therein.175
D. Financial Obligations of States Parties
While the financial obligations imposed by UNCLOS on sea-
bed miners are extensive,17 6 those obligations imposed on states
parties are even more significant. Initially, the administrative ISA
budget,177 taken as a whole, is to be assessed "based upon the scale
used for the regular budget of the United Nations 7 8 until the
Authority shall have sufficient income from other sources to meet
its administrative expenses." 179 At this point it should be noted that
no payments from the Enterprise will be made to the ISA until the
Enterprise has become self-supporting, a period not to exceed ten
years from the date of commencement of commercial produc-
175. See, e.g., id. arts. 188, 215, 278 & Annex 3, arts. 5(2), 15.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 102-11.
177. Concerning the amount of the budget, UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 161(8)(c),
162(2)(r), authorizes the Council, with three-fourths vote, to submit the proposed annual
I.S.A. budget to the Assembly for its approval. Id. The Assembly is granted the "powers and
functions" to "consider and approve [by a two-thirds vote] the proposed annual budget of the
Authority submitted by the Council." Id. arts. 159(8), 160(2)(h). While the legal cqnse-
quences of a budgetary Assembly-Council deadlock are not resolved with specificity, the
"power andfunctions" language of UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 160(2) (emphasis added), the
wording of articles 160(2)(h) and 162(2)(r) themselves, id. arts. 160(2)(h), 162(2)(r), and the
description of council "power" contained in article 162(1), id. art. 162(1), would seem to
grant the Council a controlling influence in this matter. This last provision specifies that:
The Council is the executive organ of the Authority. The Council shall have the
power to establish, in conformity with this Convention and the general policies
established by the Assembly, the specific policies to be pursued by the Authority on
any question or matter within the competence of the Authority.
Id. Finally, it must be noted that, absent a Council recommendation, the Assembly has no
power to pass a budget on its own, and that, consequently, no money could thereby be spent.
See generally UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 172 (concerning the annual budget of the
Authority); supra text accompanying notes 114-15 (limits on powers of ISA Assembly).
Concerning the ability of the United States and its allies to affect the Council budgetary vote,
see supra text accompanying notes 116-22.
178. The United States currently finances about 25% of the UN Budget, Percentage
Scales of Assessment for United Nations Budget and Net Contributions Payable for 1980 and
1981 and 1982, 1980 U.N.Y.B. 1216; the USSR, about 11%, id.; Japan, about 9%, id. at
1215; and the Federal Republic of Germany, about 8%, id.
179. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 160(2)(e). The "other sources" alluded to in UNCLOS
include, most particularly, seabed licensing fees, Enterprise earnings, ISA loans, and volun-
tary contributions. See id. art. 171(b)-(f). Concerning the likelihood of extensive voluntary
contributions being made, see A. PosT, supra note 10, at 220.
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tion. 180 Thus, the United States could reasonably be expected to
provide 25 % of the ISA budget for up to fifteen years or more from
the date at which it might choose to ratify UNCLOS.
The Enterprise, moreover, is to be provided with the funds
necessary to explore and exploit one mine site (variously estimated
to be at least U.S.$1 billion or more) 181 and to transport, process,
and market the minerals recovered therefrom182 (perhaps another
U.S.$500 million).18 3 All states which are party to UNCLOS are
required to make half of these funds available to the Enterprise-
again proportional to the scale of the regular U.N. budget assess-
ments-in the form of irrevocable, nonnegotiable, noninterest
bearing promissory notes, and to guarantee Enterprise loans for the
other half in accordance with the same proportional scale. 84 Re-
payment of the guaranteed interest-bearing loans is to take priority
over the interest-free loans, the latter of which shall be repaid
in accordance with a schedule adopted by the Assembly, upon
the recommendation of the Council (by three-fourth vote[185],
and the advice of the [Enterprise Governing] Board[ 88 ] ....
which shall take into account the paramount importance of
ensuring the effective functioning of the Enterprise and, in par-
ticular, ensuring its financial independence.18
Thus, should the United States decide to ratify UNCLOS, its total
contributions to the ISA would include about 25 % of the indeter-
minate ISA budget, interest-free loans guaranteeing perhaps as
much as U.S.$300 million to help put the Enterprise in operation,
commercial debt guarantees in a roughly equivalent amount, and
possibly additional domestic tax credits on profits repatriated to
United States operators in order to avoid double taxation-all this
in order to create an institution whose primary purpose would be
competition with and regulation of United States seabed mining
180. UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex 4, art. 10(1), (3).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
182. UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex 4, art. 11(3)(a).
183. See A. POST, supra note 10, at 29.
184. UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex 4, art. 11(3)(b), (d)(i).
185. Id. art. 161(8)(c).
186. The Governing Board is to be elected by the Assembly, upon Council nomination
by three-fourths vote, and is to have the power to approve the annual budget of the
Enterprise. See id. arts. 160(2)(c), 161(8)(b), 162(2)(c) & Annex 4, art. 6(i).
187. Id. Annex 4, art. 11(3)(f).
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seabed mining interests.I S Should the United States choose not to
become a party, it is questionable whether, and to what extent,
other states would be willing to pick up the additional 25% left
uncovered by United States contributions. Whether United States
financial institutions would be willing to underwrite loans-even
with "paper" debt guarantees from third-party states (whose repay-
ment schedule is contingent on profits being returned and the ap-
proval of the ISA Council)-is even more speculative.
E. Potential Revenue Sharing With National
Liberation Movements
One of the most significant and continuing controversies has
concerned UNCLOS' provisions permitting revenue sharing from
seabed activities (as well as from continental shelf exploitation past
200 nautical miles from the baseline 8 ") with developing states "and
peoples who have not attained full independence or other self-
governing status."190 These provisions, which could be invoked to
assist in the financing of revolutions by "national liberation move-
ments," 191 have long been a cornerstone to United States' objections
to UNCLOS. 19 2 As a consequence, the final UNCLOS draft con-
tains textual changes which require any such revenue sharing to be
pursuant to rules, regulations, and procedures approved by consen-
sus by the Council'9 3 (in which the United States would have a
188. Moreover, if the sum of the above-described contributions is insufficient to finance
one mining site, Enterprise administrative expenses, and mineral transportation, processing,
and marketing fees, the one nation-one vote Assembly (although there is a consensus require-
ment here) is empowered to "adopt ... measures for dealing with this shortfall, taking into
account the obligations of States Parties . . . and any recommendations of the Preparatory
Commission." Id. Annex 4, art. 11(3)(c).
189. Id. arts. 76, 82, 140 & Annex 2.
190. Id. arts. 160(2)(f)(i), 162(2)(o)(i).
191. Organizations which have participated as observers at UNCLOS III, and which
are permitted to sign UNCLOS in their observer capacity, include the PLO, the African
National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress of Anzania(South Africa), the African
National Council and the Patriotic Front (Zimbabwe), the African Party for the Indepen-
dence of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC), the Seychelles People's United Party
(SPUP), and the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO). See Final Act, supra
note 5, annex 1, appendix. The first three of these organizations and SWAPO signed the Final
Act, supra note 5, on December 10, 1982. See 21 I.L.M. 1477, 1477 (1982).
192. See, e.g., Malone Statement-Feb. 1982, supra note 161, at 556; Statement by
President Reagan (Jan. 29, 1982), reprinted in LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, supra note 39, at
554-55 [hereinafter cited as Reagan Statement]; supra text accompanying note 44.
193. See UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 161(8)(d), 162(2)(o)(i).
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guaranteed seat provided it ratified UNCLOS19 4). As a result, this
objection to the UNCLOS regime is no longer seriously maintained.
F. Subsequent Amendments to UNCLOS Binding the United
States Without Its Consent
That subsequent amendments to UNCLOS may bind the
United States without its consent has been strongly objected to by
the United States. This objection restates both the United States-
dualist 9 5 attitude towards international law (by virtue of which it
refuses to be bound by international legal norms to which it has not
consented) and its unwillingness to delegate its sovereign preroga-
tives to any state or quasi-legislative group of states in the future. As
a result of its dualist viewpoint, the United States will apply cus-
tomary international norms as its own internal law only when
consistent with the latest expression of its own domestic law. 96
Treaty obligations will be enforced internally only when there is no
inconsistent superceding statute.9 7 The dualist attitude, however,
does not prohibit the United States from becoming bound (from the
standpoint of international law) by treaty modifications which it
did not support and in which it did not acquiesce, provided that it
194. See supra text accompanying note 118.
195. A dualist system perceives the domestic and international legal systems as distinct,
not always applying as internal law obligations arising from international law. By virtue of
the application of this approach, maximum sovereignty is maintained. By way of contrast, a
monist system perceives domestic and international legal principles as an integral whole,
applying the latter as a "higher" order of norm in case of conflict. See G. VON CLAHN, LAW
AMONG NATIONS 9-13 (1st ed. 1965). Of course, from the international legal perspective,
domestic law does not constitute a defense to a breach of international legal obligations. See,
e.g., N. LEACH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 25 (1st ed.
1973). Nevertheless, international law also recognizes that active, continuous, and effective
protest may render an emerging customary norm nonbinding on a protesting state. See, e.g.,
Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Judgment of Dec. 18) (due to Norway's active
and continuous protest, a generally recognized three-mile limit on the territorial sea was held
not binding). For a practical defense of this principle, see Arrow, The Customary Norm,
supra note 51, at 4-9. Cf. infra note 254 (discussing purported exceptions to the rule that a
treaty does not create either rights or obligations for a third state without its consent).
196. See, e.g., Shroeder v. Bissell, 5 F.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 3 comment j (1965).
197. See U.S. CONST. art. VI; Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884); CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS
AND INTERPRETATION 490 (1973).
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had ratified a treaty which permitted such amendments to enter
into force for all parties by a less-than-unanimous vote in quasi-
legislative fashion. This, maintains the United States, is exactly
what UNCLOS permits.
Initially, for purposes of this analysis, UNCLOS' regular
amendment provisions must be severed from its "review confer-
ence" amendment provisions. Careful examination of UNCLOS'
cross-referential provisions reveals that all regular amendments are
either subject to consensus or only binding upon states ratifying
them, although amendments made at the "review conference" may
indeed become binding on nonacceding states parties without their
consent.
Amendments to UNCLOS' non-seabed provisions may be pro-
posed by any state party at any time more than ten years after of
UNCLOS' entry into force. 198 Upon receiving a timely proposal, the
ISA Secretary-General is directed to circulate it to all states par-
ties. 199 If, within twelve months thereafter, one-half or more of the
states parties favor a conference to consider it, such a conference
shall be convened.20 0 Amendments adopted by such conferences are
subject to ratification, 20 1 and are to take effect "for the States
Parties ratifying or acceding to them on the thirtieth day following
ratifica-
tion ...by two-thirds of the States Parties or by 60 States Parties,
whichever is greater. "202 Other states parties may also subsequently
ratify or accede to the amendment. 20 3 Such amendments may also
be adopted by consensus without the calling of a conference. 20 4
Amendments to UNCLOS' seabed provisions, including
amendments to the Seabeds Disputes Chamber provisions, 20 5 are
subject to initial Council approval 20 6 by consensus,20 7 and subse-
198. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 312(1).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. art. 315(2).
202. Id. art. 316(1) (emphasis added).
203. Id. art. 316(3).
204. Id. art. 313.
205. See id. Annex 6, arts. 35-40.
206. Id. art. 314(1).
207. Id. art. 161(8)(d). Some ambiguity remains, however, concerning amendments to
the Seabed Disputes Chamber provisions contained in UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex 6, arts.
35-40. These provisions are not within "Part XI," which encompasses the Seabeds Dispute
Chamber provisions contained in UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts 183-191. The latter, however,
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quent Assembly approval by a two-thirds vote.2"8 While such
amendments are to take effect for all states parties one year after
ratification by three-fourths of them, 20 9 the antecedent consensus
requirement for Council approval would give the United States (or
any state represented on the Council) the ability to ensure that it
would not become bound without its consent. 21 0
The "review conference" amendment provision, however,
present a substantially different scenario. UNCLOS provides that:
Fifteen years from 1 January of the year in which the earliest commer-
cial production commences ... ,the Assembly shall convene a confer-
ence for the review of those provisions of this Part and the rele-
vent Annexes which govern the system of ex-
ploration and exploitation of the resources of the [seabed] Area .... 2
If, five years after its commencement, the Review Conference
has not reached agreement on the system of exploration and
exploitation of the resources of the Area, it may decide during
the ensuing 12 months, by a three-fourths majority of the States
Parties, to adopt and submit to the States Parties for ratifica-
tion. . . such amendments changing or modifying the systems as
it determines necessary and appropriate. Such amendments shall
enter into force for all States Parties 12 months after. . . ratifi-
cation . . . by three fourths of the States Parties.212
While this quasi-legislative system would not be permitted to
effect preexistent contractual rights, 213 the possibility that United
States sovereignty and potentially strategic interests might be le-
gally fettered by a three-fourths vote of UNCLOS' participants
caused Ambassador Malone to testify before a House Committee
that:
The draft treaty now permits two-thirds [now three-fourths] of
the States parties acting at the review conference to adopt
appears to incorporate the former by reference. See id. arts. 314, 316(1), (5) & Annex 6, art.
41(2) (creates the potential ambiguity).
208. Id. arts. 159(8), 314(1).
209. Id. art. 316(5).
210. Amendments to provisions regarding the Law of the Sea Tribunal are subject to
consensus requirements similar to those described above. See id. Annex 6, art. 41(1).
211. Id. art. 155(1).
212. Id. art. 155(4) (emphasis added).
213. Id. art. 155(5).
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amendments to Part IX [the seabeds component] of the treaty
which would be binding on all States parties without regard to
their concurrence. It has been argued that a State which objects
to an amendment has the option to withdraw[1 4] from the
treaty if the amendment is imposed without [its] consent. This
proposal is obviously not acceptable when dealing with major
economic interests of countries which have invested significant
capital in the development of seabed mining in an international
treaty regime."-'
While review conference amendments may not impair estab-
lished contractual rights,2 16 they could well impose even more re-
strictive conditions on United States nationals' seabed mining par-
ticipation. Since such amendments would not likely come into force
until the year 2010 or thereafter, the vigor of the United States
objection must be evaluated not only in strategic and economic
terms, but also in terms of principle- specifically, the United
States' long-standing position that it will not permit itself to become
part of a quasi-legislative process by which its sovereignty could be
impaired by a majority-even a three-fourths majority-of the
nations of the world.21 7
III. THE"ALTERNATIVE" SEABED MINING REGIME
The "alternative" seabed mining regime is currently being
negotiated pursuant to United States, 218  United Kingdom,219
French, 220 West German, 221 and Japanese22 2 domestic enabling leg-
214. See id. art. 317 (permitting prospective denunciation upon one year's written
notice to the United Nations' Secretary-General).
215. Malone Statement-Feb. 1982, supra note 161, at 560.
216. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 155(5).
217. See, e.g., Malone Statement-Apr. 1982, supra note 86, at 596; Reagan State-
ment, supra note 192, at 555; supra text accompanying note 161.
218. See U.S. Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1402 (b)(3), 1428(f) (Supp. IV 1980).
219. See Deep Sea Mining (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1981, ch. 53, § 3(1), reprinted in
20 I.L.M. 1218, 1220 (1981) [hereinafter cited as U.K. Act].
220. See Loi no. 81-1135 du 23 d~eembre 1981, Sur l'exploration des resources mintrales
des grands fonds marins, 1981 Journal Officiel de la Rpublique Fran~aise [J.O.] 3499-500,
1982 Dalloz-Sirey Legislation [D.S.L.] 11-12 (Fr.), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 808 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as French Act].
221. Act of Interim Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining, § 14, 1980 Bundesgesetzblatt,
Tell 1 [BGBI] 11457 (W. Ger.), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 393, 396 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
West German Act]; see also Act to Amend the Interim Regulation, 1982 BGB1 136 (W.
Ger.), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 832 (1982).
222. Law on Interim Measures for Deep Seabed Mining of July 1982, ch. 4, art. 29
(Japan), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 102 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Japanese Act]. The recent
evolution of the "alternative" seabed mining reime is described in Cohen, International
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islation. The regime provides a legal framework for states which
may wish either to exploit seabed minerals outside the UNCLOS
regime, or to resolve conflicting claims to specified seabed areas on
an interim basis, pursuant to UNCLOS' conditions precedent to
applying for pioneer investor status.2 23 The status of this regime as
an "alternative" to the UNCLOS approach remains tentative, since
the enabling legislation enacted by all participating states specifies
the "interim" character of the regime, pending the adoption of a
general international regime which is universally agreed upon.
Should such a regime emerge, the "alternative" regime would
merely have served as a conflict-resolution mechanism, resolving
inter-party disputes concerning the equities of the various seabed
claims. 224  Should a universal 225  regime not emerge through
UNCLOS, however, the alternative regime could serve as a legal
framework for the reciprocating 2 6 states to exercise their freedoms
of the seas22 7 without conflict between the parties.
2 8
On September 15,. 1981, pursuant to section 2(b) of the United States'
Deep Seabed Hard !flneral Resources Act (Seabed Mining Act), 229 the
Office of Ocean Minerals and Energy of the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration [NOAA] promulgated regulations 20 affecting
Cooperation on Seabed Mining, in LAW OF THE SEA 101, 104-08 (B. Oxman, D. Caron & C.
Budderi eds. 1983).
223. See Resolution II, supra note 135, para. 5.
224. The UNCLOS criteria are specified in Resolution II, supra note 133, para. 5(d).
See also supra note 141 (enumerating the criteria); infra note 240 (Four-Power Agreement
criteria for applicant selection). a
225. See Declaration of Principles, supra note 160, para. 9. Ambassador Pinto of Sri
Lanka stated at the 1978 Law ofithe Sea Institute Workshop:
And we did agree that this treaty [to be established] shall be "of a universal
character," and that it should be agreed upon by the community in general, not by a
handful of states, or even by a substantial number of them. The words of the
Declaration of Principles . . . are there to prove it.
Statement of Ambassador M.C.W. Pinto to the 1978 Law of the Sea Institute (Dec. 11,
1978), reprinted in Alternatives in Deepsea Mining, 1978 LAw OF THE SEA INST. WORKSHOP
PROCEEDINcS. 13, 14 (S. Allen & J. Craven eds. 1979). See also supra text accompanying note
68 (preclusion of claims which are inconsistent with the international regime).
226. See supra note 12; see also U.S. Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1428 (Supp. IV 1980).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
228. This is by virtue of mutual and reciprocal recognition of licenses issued by each to
its nationals.
229. U.S. Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
230. Deep Sea Mining Regulations for Exploration Licenses, 15 C.F.R. part 970 (1981),
reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1233-58 (1981); see also 46 Fed. Reg. 45,890-95 (1981), reprinted in 20
I.L.M. 1228-33 (1981) (supplementary information including summary of comments and
responses).
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United States citizens23" ' wishing to participate in the exploration23 2 phase
of the seabed mining venture.2 33 The four major consortia involving
United States participants 34 had already filed exploration license applica-
tions with NOAA, but final approval had been withheld pending domestic
conflict resolution. By the late summer of 1983, however, the domestic
conflicts had been resolved and new area coordinates were submitted to
NOAA during October. Internationally, these consortia, along with
AFERNOD 235 and the DOMA group, 236 had also signed arbitration agree-
ments by August, and the international conflicts had generally been re-
solved by the signing of informal settlement agreements as of early 1984.
While a formal conflict resolution agreement between the United States,
United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany entered
into force on September 2, 1982,237 to provide for the contingency of
nonagreement by the mining consortia involved, its terms initially pro-
vided only for conflict identification 38 among pioneer investors, permit-
ting six months for the parties to agree to binding arbitration2 39 before
mandatory arbitration 240 could be invoked. Consistent with the voluntary
231. That citizenship and not territoriality is the basis for jurisdiction is made amply
clear by sections 2 and 3 of the U.S. Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (Supp. IV 1980). Concerning
the cognizability and potential application of the jurisdictional assertion, see Arrow, The
"Alternative" Seabed, supra note 11, at 2 n.3.
232. "Exploration" is defined in the U.S. Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1403(5) (Supp. IV 1980), to
include:
(A) any at-sea observation and evaluation activity which has, as its objective,
the establishment and documentation of-
(i) the nature, shape, concentration, location, and tenor of a hard mineral
resource; and
(ii) the environmental, technical, and other appropriate factors which must
be taken into account to achieve commercial recovery; and
(B) the taking from the deep seabed of such quantities of any hard mineral
resources as are necessary for the design, fabrication, and testing of equipment
which is intended to be used in the commercial recovery and processing of such
resource.
id.
233. These regulations are examined in detail in Arrow, The "Alternative" Seabed,
supra note 11, at 3-24.
234. See supra note 23.
235. See supra note 25.
236. DOMA is the acronym for the Deep Ocean Minerals Association, which is a
Japanese mining group.
237. Agreement Concerning Interim Arrangements Relating to Polymetallic Nodules of
the Deep Sea Bed, Sept. 2, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 950 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Four-Power
Agreement].
238. Id. para. 1.
239. Id. sched., pt. II, para. 9(2).
240. Id. The criteria for applicant selection pursuant to the Four-Power Agreement are
similar to those specified by UNCLOS in its treatment of pioneer investor applications. See
Resolution II, supra note 133, para. 5(d); see also supra note 141 (enumerating the criteria).
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arbitration proceedings recommended by this Four-Power Agreement, the
governments have not been called upon to intervene, though they are still
meeting to ensure the preservation of the arbitration-directed agreements
which have thus far been concluded.
On October 6, 1983, the Environmental Protection Agency held
hearings concerning the issuance of a general permit24' relating to dis-
charge by vessels subject to the United States Seabed Mining Act. 242 Fol-
lowing issuance of this permit, draft environmental impact statements
concerning the terms, conditions, and restrictions on nodule recovery,
required by the Seabed Mining Act, were promulgated on May 18, 1974.
Final environmental impact statements and exploration licenses are ex-
pected to be ready by about August or September, 1984.
Simultaneously, NOAA has been working on draft regulations con-
cerning the commercial recovery phase. The current expectation is that
the draft regulations will be published by the late summer of 1984, and
the final regulations for the issuance of recovery permits before 1985. This
would allow ample time for permit issuance prior to the January 1, 1988
start-up date for commercial recovery contemplated by the United
States' 2 43 and the other three powers' domestic legislation.
IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE SEABEDS: 1984
Legal as well as economic and political factors must obviously be
considered in evaluating the relative merits of the potentially competing
seabed regimes. The requisite legal analysis necessitates consideration of
customary international law antecedent to the signing of UNCLOS and
the Final Act of UNCLOS III on December 10, 1982; the potential effect
of UNCLOS as an "objective regime"; and any acts of the United States or
its allies which might estop them from denying the opposability to them of
UNCLOS' seabed mining provisions. These issues will now be addressed in
turn.
A. Antecedent Custom
As has been indicated, the freedom of the seas principle, permitting
nonexclusive use of the oceans and ocean floor 44 past the territorial seas of
coastal states, reigned supreme for well over 350 years.2 45 Even the general
241. This permit is required by the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976), and its
accompanying regulations, 40 C.F.R. 122.28 (1983).
242. U.S. Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1401 (Supp. IV 1980).
243. Id. § 1412(c)(1)(D).
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agreement on the designation of the seabeds as the "common heritage of
mankind" in 197024 was likely without binding legal effect, due to its
ambiguity, 47 the lack of states' opinio juris regarding it,24 and its incon-
sistent invocation in subsequent state practice.2 49 Thus, prior to the coa-
lescing of the specific requirements of the common heritage principle in
UNCLOS, it is likely that the seabeds, the minerals thereon, the superja-
cent water column, and surface of the sea (beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction) remained free to use and exploit by all on a nonexclusive
basis, subject to the norm that such freedoms be exercised with reasonable
regard for the interests of other states wishing to do the same.25°
B. Debunking the Myth of the "Objective Regime"
Given the long-standing nature of the res inter alios acta rule 25' and
the sound foundation of this rule in general historical notions of state
sovereignty,252 a legitimate threshold question may be addressed as to
whether any exceptions exist thereto at all. The Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, for example, in describing the sources of interna-
tional law, refers to "international conventions, whether general or par-
ticular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States. '" 253
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, moreover, provides that
"a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third state
without its consent. 2 54
244. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
245. See generally Arrow, The Customary Norm, supra note 51, at 2-21; Arrow, The
Proposed Regime, supra note 4, at 352-68; supra note 3; supra text accompanying notes 48-50
(discussion of the free seas principle).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 63-70.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
248. See Arrow, The Customary Norm, supra note 51, at 24-26; supra text accompany-
ing note 71.
249. See, e.g., Arrow, The Customary Norm, supra note 51, at 28-38.
250. See supra note 4.
251. This rule provides that treaty obligations have no effect on states not parties
thereto. See supra text accompanying note 7.
252. See, e.g., S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 19 (Judgment
of Sept. 7).
253. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38(1)(a) (emphasis added).
254. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 34, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. at 886.
(emphasis added). See also S. ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES: A GUIDE To THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION 224-25 (1970) (guide to legislative history of article 34).
The so-called "exceptions" to this principle contained in articles 35 and 38 of the Vienna
Convention, supra note 7, are not really exceptions at all. Article 35 specifically requires that
a state, in writing, expressly agree to be bound to any purported obligation. Vienna Conven-
tion, supra note 7, art. 35, reprinted in 63 Am. J. INT'L L. at 886; see also S. ROSENNE, supra,
at 226-27 (guide to legislative history of article 35). Article 38, recognizing the possibility that
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International cases have also given broad support to the res inter alios
acta principle as an integral component of state sovereignty. In the Upper
Silesia case, the Permanent Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.) stated
that "[a] treaty only creates law as between states which are parties to it;
in case of doubt no rights can be deduced from it in favor of third
states."255 Concerning attempts to bind third-party states to obligations
without their consent, the international courts have taken an equally
strident position. In the River Oder case, the P.C.I.J. refused to bind
Poland to provisions of the Barcelona Convention, which it had not
ratified.25 6 In the case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of
Gex, the P.C.I.J. held that "[a]rticle 435 of the Treaty of Versailles is not
binding upon Switzerland, which is not a Party to the Treaty, except to
the extent to which that country accepted it."257 In the North Sea Conti-
nental Shelf cases, 258 the International Court of Justice [I.C.J.] stated that
"when a number of States ...have drawn up a convention specifically
providing for a particular method by which the intention to become
bound . . . is to be manifested . . . it is not lightly to be presumed that a
State which has not carried out these formalities ... has nevertheless
somehow become bound in another way." 259 The United States2 0 and the
Soviet Union 26 1 have taken similar positions.
a treaty-specified norm may simply codify custom, subjects the norm to the protest principle
in any case. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 38, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. at 887;
see, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ir.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, 10-14 (Judgment of Feb. 2); J.
BRIERLY, OUTLOOK FoR INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (1944); M. SORENSEN, MANUAL OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (1976); G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 128-30 (W.
Butler trans. 1974); MacCibbon, Some Observations on the Part of Protest in International
Law, 30 BrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 293, 309-14 (1953). See also supra note 195 (discussing view of
international law and the protest principle).
255. (Ger. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 7, at 29 (Judgment of May 25).
256. (U.K. v. Pol.), 1929 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 23, at 20, 22 (Judgment of Sept. 10).
257. (Fr. v. Switz.), 1932 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 46, at 141 (Judgment of June 7)
(emphasis added).
258. (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
259. Id. at 25-26.
260. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, el. 2. In the specific context of recent developments in
ocean law, see, e.g., Reagan Statement, supra note 192, at 555. Theodore Kronmiller,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, testified before a Senate
subcommittee on September 15, 1982 that: "The exercise by the United States of rights and
freedoms under international law can be limited only with our consent. This point holds true
with regard both to our right to mine the seabed and to our right to navigate under, on or
over the world's oceans, including international straits. We have those rights today, we are
proceeding with their exercise, and we intend to maintain them." Law of the Sea Negotia-
tions: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations,
and Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982)
(available on microfiche CIS 83, abstract no. S381-15, pt. 1 of 2).
261. See, e.g., G. TUNKIN, supra note 254, at 128-30; Tunkin, International Law, the
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Although scholarly opinion exists to the contrary, many publicists
have expressed skepticism concerning the existence of any exceptions to the
res inter alios acta rule. Verzijl, for example, wrote:
There is no solid ground for assuming that the general conviction
that the effect of treaties is. . . confined to the parties has ceased
to be valid in later periods, or that a contrary conviction prevails
at the present time, despite isolated voices which are sometimes
heard in favour of the law-creating effect of multilateral conven-
tions .... 262
Brownlie, though recognizing that treaties may provide evi-
dence of custom, 26 3 has asserted that "there is no clear and dogmatic
distinction between 'lawmaking' treaties and others, "264 and, in his
discussion of the types of treaties which, by their nature, purport to
be "lawmaking," is careful to limit the effects of even such treaties
to the parties.26 5
Kelsen notes that it is the function of all treaties to "make law"
between the parties, and has referred to the term "law-making
treaty" as a pleonasm. 26 6
Wolfgang Friedmann, while recognizing that discordant
voices have been heard, has written that: "The principle imperfec-
tion of the international law-making treaty, as distinct from legisla-
tion proper, derives from the principle of national sovereignty. A
treaty must rest on the consent of all the parties. ' 2 7 Sorensen
further supported this view by drawing an analogy to contract law,
Contemporary and Classic, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF KRISHNA RAO
48, 56 (M. Nawaz ed. 1976). Professor Tunkin, a prominent Soviet jurist, diplomat, and
scholar, has often been cited as the leading Soviet authority on international law. See, e.g.,
C. VON GLAHN, supra note 195, at 14 n.5. See also J. HILDEBRAND, SOVIET INTERNATIONAL
LAW 26-41 (1968); J. TRiSKA & R. SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAW, AND POLICY OF SOVIET
TREATIES 40-41 (1962).
262. 6 J. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 277 (1973).
263. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 12-13 (2d ed. 1973). See
also I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 76, 77 (1973); Baxter,
Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
275 (1965-1966).
264. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 263, at 13.
265. Id. at 12.
266. H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 456-57 (R. Tucker 2d ed. 1967).
267. W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124 (1964)
(emphasis added). See also S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ., ser. A, No. 10, at 18, 19
(Judgment of Sept. 7).
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recognizing the necessity of a coincidence of the wills of the par-
ties. 6 8
Nevertheless, both the Vienna Convention 269 and the writings
of several publicists270 have asserted the existence of several possible
"exceptions" to the res inter alios acta principle, relying on either
the quantity or quality of support which a particular treaty enjoys,
or characteristics intrinsic to the particular treaty itself. These pur-
ported exceptions may be classified into several (sometimes overlap-
ping) categories, including exceptions based upon: the concurrence
of treaty provisions with customary international law; the intent of
a treaty to create obligations for a third state and the third state's
acceptance thereof; the creation by treaty of a servitude on territory
by its former sovereign or in part by the servient state itself; the
adherence in a treaty regime of all the "great powers"; and, the
intrinsically "constitutive" or "quasi-legislative" character of a par-
ticular treaty in question. These categories will now be examined to
ascertain whether any of the purported exceptions are really excep-
tions at all, and if they are, the extent to which they are legally
cognizable as limitations upon sovereignty as a matter of customary
international law. The conclusions drawn from this analysis will
then be applied to determine the prospective impact on UNCLOS'
seabed provisions on nonsignatory states.
At this juncture, one critical threshold observation must be
made. The res inter alios acta rule, of course, constitutes a reaffir-
mation and preservation of historically prevalent notions of sover-
eignty. As recognized by the P.C.I.J. in the S.S. Lotus 271 case, the
process of customary international limitation on states' sovereignty
"leaves them . . . a wide measure of discretion which is only limited
in certain cases by prohibitive rules. '2 72 Thus, if there are any
limitations on state sovereignty not based upon consent, 273 such
268. See M. SORENSEN, supra note 254, at 15, 17, 124.
269. See Supra note 7.
270. See infra text accompanying notes 271-355.
271. (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 (Judgment of Sept. 7).
272. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
273. This does not include limitations arising pursuant to the ius cogens doctrine, which
is clearly inapplicable here. In order to constitute jus cogens, or a peremptory norm of
international law, the asserted norm must enjoy a high degree of acquiescence and be moral
or humanitarian in character. See, e.g., Verdross, ]us Dispotivum and lus Cogens in Interna-
tional Law, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 55, 59 (1966); see generally Onuf & Birney, Peremptory
Norms of International Law: Their Source, Function and Future, 4 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL.
187 (1974) (examining the question, "what is the source of peremptory norms?"). Such
peremptory norms include piracy, slave trade, genocide, and war crimes. See, e.g., High Seas
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exceptions to the res inter alios acta rule would need to be affirma-
tively established as norms of customary international law, with the
party seeking to establish the exception bearing the burden of prov-
ing that the four requirements necessary to the establishment of
such a norm had been met.2 74 Moreover, in attempting to establish
the opinio juri 2 75 requirement of custom, forebearances by a state
to pursue certain activities, cited to evidence its recognition of the
"law-making" character of a treaty establishing such prohibitions
upon it must be carefully examined to determine whether a nar-
rower ground for explaining that state's behavior may be found.
For example, a state's forebearance from action forbidden by a
treaty which it has not ratified might alternatively be explained by
either its incapacity to act, or by its perception that the action not
taken was precluded by customary international law. Only if the
state's forebearance can be shown to arise from a perception by the
forebearing state that the treaty prohibition had achieved "law-
making" or "objective regime" status as such (erga omnes) could
evidence supporting the existence of an "objective regime" excep-
tion to the res inter alios acta rule be found. This article maintains
that no such evidence may be found and, moreover, that any
purported exceptions, to the extent of their validity, are ultimately
based upon consent.
1. Concurrent Custom
Article 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties27
6
Convention, supra note 3, arts. 13, 14, 15; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1961);
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(a), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). See
generally Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 411 (1948), reprinted in 41 AM. J.
IN'TL L. 172 (1947). The principles and judgment of the International Military Tribunal
were unanimously affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly, G.A. Res. 95, U.N.
Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188 (1946). That deep seabed nodule recovery violates no jus cogens
principle is maintained, inter alia, in Arrow, The Proposed Regime, supra note 4, at 382-84.
274. The four-part test for the establishment of a new prohibitory customary norm
includes a quantitative element (there must be a general practice among states of refraining
from specified activity), a psychological element, commonly referred to as opinio juris (the
forebearance must be undertaken in the belief that the forebearance is legally required), a
qualitative element (the forebearance must be adhered to, inter alia, by the "specially
affected states"), and a temporal element (where a new prohibitory custom is asserted to have
developed quickly, the state practice must have been "extensive and virtually uniform").
Arrow, The Customary Norm, supra note 51, at 2-4 (citations omitted).
275. See supra note 274.
276. Supra note 7, art, 38.
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provides that "[n]othing in Articles 34 to 37 [which articulate the
res inter alios acta rule] precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from
becoming binding upon a third State as a customary rule of interna-
tional law, recognized as such.1 277 This principle was formally
recognized by the International Law Commission over a generation
ago when it reported that:
A principle or rule of customary international law may be em-
bodied in a bipartite or multipartite agreement so as to have...
conventional force for the States parties to the agreement so long
as the agreement is in force; yet it would continue to be binding
as a principle or rule of customary international law for other
states. 1
78
Both publicists2 79 and the I.C.J.280 have also given support to this
quite reasonable premise. Nevertheless, due to the viability of the
protest principle,2 8 1 custom is ultimately founded on consent, and
therefore does not constitute a true exception to the res inter alios
acta rule. 282 Many of the precedents widely thought to support the
existence of exceptions to the rule are easily explicable within the
perimeters of the concurrent custom approach.
The United Nations Charter is often cited as an example of an
"objective regime" in that it purports to create new rights and
obligations for nonratifying states without their consent.2 83 While
some have questioned its authority to do so as ultra vires, 284 its
277. Id. For a synopsis of the legislative history of article 38, see S. ROSENNE, supra note
254, at 236-37.
278. Report of the International Law Commission of the General Assembly, 5 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1, reprinted in 1950 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 364, 368.
279. See, e.g., A. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 255 (1961); R. ROXBURGH, INTERNA-
TIONAL CONVENTIONS AND THIRD STATES 51-60, 112 (1917); I. SINCLAIR, supra note 263, at 76-
77; M. SORENSEN, supra note 254, at 154-55, 295; Baxter, supra note 263, passim.
280. See generally North Sea Continental Shelf, (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.),
1969 I.C.J. 4, 32-41 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
281. See, e.g., MacGibbon, Customary International Law and Acquiescence, 33 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 115, 131-32 (1957); MacGibbon, Some Observations on the Part oJ Protest in
International Law, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 293 passim (1953); Tunkin, Co-Existence and
International Law, 95 Recueil des Cours 3, 13 (1958).
282. See supra text accompanying note 278.
283. See, e.g., J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 327 (6th ed. 1963). In this regard, see
U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 2(6), 2(7), 4, 32, 35(2), 39, 41, 42, 50, 51. See generally L.
GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO, THE CHARTER OF TIlE UNITED NATIONS (1949).
284. See, e.g., J. VERIZIJL, supra note 262, at 279. See generally H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 791-805 (1950) (discussing right of self-defense and article 51).
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ability to bind nonratifying states has been partially affirmed (at
least by way of dictum) in the Reparations,8 5 case in which the
I.C.J. obliquely referred to the "objective regime" approach as a
partial justification for its holding.286 In fact, a narrower and more
tenable basis for the holding exists. The issue in the Reparations
case was whether the United Nations had standing to sue members
or non-members for injuries to either the United Nations directly or
to its agents. It is submitted that the capacity issue, rather than
being contingent on the Charter's status as an "objective regime,"
has more to do with the capacity of states to invest the U.N. with
agency authority, much like that enjoyed by the other international
composite bodies.28 7 None would argue that this latter group of
organizations necessarily possesses "objective regime" status, but all
have enjoyed international capacity for some purposes. Moreover,
as early as 1927, the P.C.I.J. recognized that a "breach of an
engagement involves an obligation to make reparation," ' 288 as a
principle of customary international law.289 That this customary
norm was not limited to contractual delicts is evidenced, inter alia,
by the Trail Smelter 290 Case, in which damages were awarded to
the United States on the basis of sulphur dioxide pollution from a
Canadian smelter.
These precedents furnish ample basis for the decision in the
Reparations case without the necessity of invoking the Charter as
an "objective regime." Furthermore, the primary Charter obliga-
tions for nonmembers29' were probably already part of the corpus
of customary international law at the time the Charter was signed,
due to their universal acceptance by the close of World War 11292
and to the belated but widespread accession to the approach articu-
285. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J.
174 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 11).
286. Id. at 185.
287. See, e.g., Final Act, supra note 1, annex.
288. Chorzow Factory (Jurisdiction) (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, at 21
(Judgment of July 26).
289. Id.
290. (U.S. v. Can.) 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941).
291. These obligations relate to abstaining from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity and political independence of states, U.N. CHARTER art, 2, para. 4, and
the obligation to peacefully settle disputes, id. art. 33.
292. See, e.g., M. SORENSEN, supra note 254, at 219.
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lated by the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War.29 3 In any
case, by about 1960, the rules of the United Nations Charter had
certainly come to represent norms of customary international
law,294 so its binding force is not contingent on its status as an
"objective regime."
Other examples cited in favor of the "objective regime" excep-
tion to the res inter alios acta rule may also be more narrowly
interpreted by reference to the concurrent custom approach. The
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 2 5 has now acquired universal acceptance,
and therefore owes any binding effect it may have on nonratifying
states to its status as a customary norm.298 The same may be said of
both the Vienna Convention 27 and the Outer Space Treaty.29 8
293. General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy,
opened for signature Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (entered into
force for the United States July 24, 1929); see also M. SORENSEN, supra note 254, at 219.
294. See Giraud, Modification et terminaison des traites collectifs, 49 ANNUAIRE DE
l'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 5, 19 (1961).
295. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, United States-United Kingdom-U.S.S.R., 14 U.S.T. 1313,
T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, reprinted in 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 1026 (1963).
296. See, e.g., K. HOLLOWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW 596 (1967).
297. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7. Both the general practice of the world
community and the United States, prior to ratification, recognized the Vienna Convention as
"the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice." Lee, The Law of the Sea
Convention and Third States, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 541, 553-54 (1983) (quoting 5 EXEC. DOC.
L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971) (letter of Dep't of State submitting Vienna Convention to the
President of the United States)); see, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 47 (Advisory Opinion of June 21).
298. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 386 (1967). The Outer
Space Treaty was ratified by all the major space powers, as well as by such diverse states as
Brazil, Ecuador, Fiji, the Democratic Republic of Germany, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Libya, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Zambia. By 1982, it had been ratified by 76
states. Although articles 3 to 13 of the Treaty purport to bind only states parties, articles 1
and 2 (mandating freedom of exploration, sovereign equality, and precluding sovereign
claims), purport to bind all states and reflect principles theretofore universally agreed upon.
Its comprehensive force is therefore resultant of its status as custom, not its status as an
"objective regime." See Declaration of Legal Principles Governing Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR (1280th plen. mtg.),
U.N. Doc. A/C.l/L. 331(1963), reprinted in 3 I.L.M. 157 (1964); 58 AM. J. INT'L. L. 477
(1964). See generally H. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, THE LAW RELATED TO ACTIrVTIES OF MAN IN
SPACE 66-87 (1970).
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The treaties establishing the neutrality of Switzerland, 2 9 Bel-
gium, 300 Austria, 30 l Luxembourg, 30 2 and the Aaland Islands 30 3 are
also cited as having created "objective regimes." 304 However, due to
the universal acceptance of the neutral status of all the above states
(except Belgium, whose status as a neutralized state was terminated
following World War 1305), it is submitted that the "neutralization"
299. See Final Act ot the Congress of Vienna, June 9, 1815, art. 84, 2 Martens Nouveau
Recuefl 379, 419 (1814-15). This Act was confirmed by the Declaration of Paris of Nov. 20,
1815, in which Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia guaranteed Switzerland's
territorial integrity and neutrality in perpetuity. See I M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 345 (1963). This stipulation was later ratified by article 102(9) of the Swiss
Constitution, reprinted in 3 A. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 932, 959 (rev. 3d ed.
1968).
300. At the London Conference of 1831, it was first decided that Belgium should
become an independent and neutralized state. See, e.g., J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 81 (7th ed. 1972). This arrangement was confirmed by the Treaty of
London, Apr. 19, 1839, 16 Martens Nouveau Recueil 788, 790 (1830-39), which severed
Belgium from Holland, and by virtue of which Austria, France, Great Britain, and Russia
(but not Holland) guaranteed its neutrality. Id. See Ion, Treaties of Neutrality, 13 MICH. L.
REv. 368, 369 (1915). Belgian neutrality was violated by Germany in 1914, and was effec-
tively terminated by King Albert's statement to the Belgian Parliament on November 22,
1918: "Belgium, victorious and freed from the neutrality that was imposed upon her by states
which have been shaken to their foundations by the war, will enjoy complete independence.
Belgium, reestablished in all its rights, will rule its destinies according to its aspirations and in
full sovereignty." See C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 n.4 (2d. ed. 1934). Belgium's
fully renewed sovereignty was later confirmed by the Treaty of Versailles. See generally D.
THOMAS, THE GUARANTEE OF BELGIAN INDEPENDENCE AND NEUTRALITY IN EUROPEAN DIPLO-
MACY, 1830's-1930's (1984).
301. Austria was neutralized pursuant to its agreement with the Soviet Union on April
15, 1955. See generally Verdross, Austria's Permanent Neutrality and the United Nations
Organization, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 61 (1956); Note, Austria's Permanent Neutrality, 50 AM J.
INT'L L. 418 (1956). The Soviet-Austrian agreement was recognized by the United States in
December 1955, and by the other great powers and other states shortly thereafter. Dep't of
State Release No. 680 (Dec. 6, 1955), quoted in 1 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 299, at 344; see
also J. STARKE, supra note 300, at 133.
302. Luxembourg's neutrality was guaranteed by Austria, France, Great Britain, Prus-
sia, and Russia (and recognized by Belgium, itself a neutral state), in the Treaty of London,
May 11, 1867, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil 445 (1st ser. 1873).
303. The Aaland Islands were declared to be under Finnish Sovereignty, but demilitar-
ized, by the Convention Relating to the Non-Fortification and Neutralization of the Aaland
Islands, Oct. 20, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 211, reprinted in 17 AM. J. INT'L L. Sup. 1 (1923). For a
description of the circumstances leading to the recognition of the islands, see Gregory, The
Neutralization of the Aaland Islands, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 69-70 (1923); Note, The Aaland
Islands Question, 15 Am. J. INT'L L. 268, 269 (1921).
304. See, e.g., J. BRIERLY, supra note 283, at 326-27; A. MGNAIR, supra note 279, at 256,
260; McNair, The Function and Differing Legal Character of Treaties, 11 BIrT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 113, 114 (1930).
305. See supra note 300.
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precedents are also more narrowly explicable at least on the basis of
regional 36 (and likely on the basis of universal) customary interna-
tional law. 307 Moreover, the "servitude" rationale 30 8 also furnishes a
narrower ratio decidendi for explaining the general recognition of
the obligations of neutrality treaties. 309 Their binding impact upon
nonratifying states is, therefore, not contingent on their status as
"objective regimes."
For these and other reasons, many publicists have concluded
that the concurrent custom principle is the only "exception" to the
res inter alios acta rule, but, as has been indicated, it is not an
exception at all. 310 In its deliberations leading to the drafting of the
Vienna Convention, for example, the International Law Commis-
sion, after examining the cited precedents and others, concluded
that
[i]n none of these cases . . . can it properly be said that the
treaty itself has legal effects for third States. They are cases
where, without establishing any treaty relation between them-
selves and the parties to the treaty, other States recognize rules
formulated in a treaty[ 31] as binding customary law. In short,
306. The cognizability of regional custom can be traced as far back as the ancient Greek
city-states. J. STARKE, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (1965). During the early twentieth
century, the concept of "particular" international law, or rules of conduct recognized as
binding among only certain groups of states, gained formal and widespread support. See A.
D'AMATO, THE CONcEPr OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 223-36 (1971). The concept of
regionalism, a natural response to shared values and problems, was given formal interna-
tional cognizance in Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276-78 (Judgment of Nov. 20)
(not proved in case). In that case, the ICJ recognized that Latin American countries followed
rules of international law concerning political asylum which differed significantly from those
norms commanding general acceptance elsewhere in the world. Id. at 276-78 (not proved),
295 (Alvarez, J., dissenting), 316-18 (Read, J., dissenting). That the cited neutralization
precedents may constitute such custom, due to their long usage and regional (European)
nature, is supported by, e.g., 1 J. WESTLAKE, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 30 (2d ed.
1924), and by application of the four-part customary norm test alluded to above. See supra
note 274.
307. See, e.g., J. STARKE, supra note 300, at 135 ("Switzerland's status as a permanent
neutral remains a fundamental principle of international law."). It may also be noted here
that the neutrality of Luxembourg has been continuously recognized for over a hundred
years, and that that of Austria has been respected since its declaration in 1955.
308. For a discussion of the scope of this rationale, see infra text accompanying notes
334-52.
309. See injra text accompanying notes 335-46.
310. See supra text accompanying note 277.
311. This issue is considered more fully pursuant to the "intent and acceptance" rubric.
See infra text accompanying notes 318-34.
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for these States the source of the binding force of the rules is
custom, not the treaty. 312
For this reason, the Commission refrained from including any pro-
visions dealing separately with "objective regimes."3"3
While it has been suggested that, since 140 states signed
UNCLOS on December 10, 1982,314 and several more have signed
thereafter, the treaty may soon achieve customary legal status, 31 5 it
must be recalled that signature is quite different from ratification
and that, to constitute a binding customary regime, UNCLOS will
need ratification,316 inter alia, by the "specially affected states. 31 7
2. Intent and Acceptance
The other purported exception to the res inter alios acta rule
recognized by the Vienna Convention is stated as follows: "An
obligation arises for a third state from a provision of a treaty if the
parties intend the provision to be the means of establishing the
obligation and the third state expressly accepts that obligation in
writing. ' 318 While the Vienna Convention's writing requirement is
new, the underlying premise of the "intent and acceptance" ratio-
nale is not. Brownlie, for example, recognized that, prior to the
Vienna Convention, international law permitted third-party non-
ratifying states to become bound by treaty obligations provided that
their conduct evidenced an intent to "accept the provisions of mul-
tilateral conventions as representing general international law.
319
Evidence of such intent, however, must be conclusive.
320
311. This issue is considered more fully pursuant to the "intent and acceptance" rubric.
See infra text accompanying notes 318-34.
312. [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 231 (commentary to article 34).
313. Id. See L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 634 (1980) [hereinafter cited as L. HENKIN]; Lee, supra note 297, at
565.
314. See 21 I.L.M. 1477 (1982) (list of states).
315. See, e.g., Macrae, Customary International Law and the United Nations' Law of
the Sea Treaty, 13 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 181, 212 (1983).
316. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 306.
317. See supra note 274.
318. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 35 (emphasis added). A synthesis of the
drafting history of this provision is contained in S. ROSENNE, supra note 254, at 226-27.
319. I. BROWNL1E, supra note 263, at 12-13. Accession, where permitted, is the surest
means of accomplishing this result. See, e.g., J. VERZIJL, supra note 262, at 278.
320. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 263, at 11-12. Brownlie cites Asylum (Colom. v. Peru),
1950 I.C.J. 266 (Judgment of Nov. 20), in which the ICJ demanded evidence of a "consistent
and uniform" practice. Id. at 277.
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The basis of this obligation for the third state to be bound to
the "intent and acceptance" principle is not the treaty itself, but
rather the collateral consent to or acquiescence in the obligation. 32'
Thus, like the "concurrent custom" approach, "intent and accept-
ance" is not a true exception to state sovereignty reflected by the res
inter alios acta principle.
Pursuant to such an intent approach, several other precedents
cited to support the existence of an "objective regime" exception
may be more narrowly explained.
While strong evidence exists that the humanitarian obligations
articulated by the Hague Convention IV of 1907322 were already
mandated by customary international law3 23 (and thus their bind-
ing force on nonratifiers was due to "concurrent custom," not
"intent and acceptance"), it must be noted that the convention
contained a so-called "general participation clause," which limited
the effect of the annexed regulations to parties to the Convention
itself.3 24 While Germany, a nonratifier, attempted to exculpate
itself from these humanitarian obligations in 1914,325 other nonrat-
ifying states accepted and applied them, partly out of opinio
juris, 3 6 partly out of self-interest, and partly out of true humanitar-
ian concerns. For the latter group of states, "intent and acceptance"
is surely a more narrow supportable basis for any subsequent obli-
gation to be bound than is the hypothesis of the "objective regime."
A similar observation may be made concerning the obligations
imposed by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.327 Like the
321. J. SINCLAIR, supra note 263, at 78.
322. Hague Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (1907) [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention IV).
323. See, e.g., G. VON GLAHN, supra note 261, at 543-44. Since the Hague rules had
become custom by 1939, obligations of nonratifiers after that date would clearly be explicable
pursuant to the concurrent custom approach. See NUREMBERG JUDGMENTS, 13 ANN. DIG. No.
92 passim (1946); S. BAILEY, PaOHIBTIONs AND CONSTRAINTS IN WAR 59 (1972); I. BROWNLIE,
supra note 263, at 12; J. ScoTr, THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND
1907, at 100 (3d ed. 1918).
324. Hague Convention IV, supra note 322, arts. 1-2.
325. See C. VON GLAHN, supra note 261, at 544.
326. See supra note 274.
327. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3517, T.I.A.S. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 386; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3317, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75
U.N.T.S. 236; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick,
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3219, T.I.A.S.
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Hague Convention of 1907,328 all four 1949 conventions provide:
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the
present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall
remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall further
be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the
latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.329
While authority exists to support the proposition that the particu-
lars of all four 1949 conventions have now achieved the status of
customary international law 330 (in which case, again, their binding
force for nonratifying states would be concurrent custom, not the
treaty), were this not the case, 33' recognition of their binding effect
on specifically consenting states would still be appropriate under
the "intent and acceptance" approach.
The "intent and acceptance" approach, however, is of little
utility when applied to seabed law. Since the UNCLOS regime
creates arguable navigational benefits as well as seabed exploitation
burdens for the United States and its industrialized allies ,332 it
would make little sense for any of these countries to specifically
accept its burdens in writing 333 without ratifying UNCLOS as a
whole, so as to avail themselves of whatever benefits might be
available thereunder.
3. Servitude Creation
Pursuant to the servitude creation approach, treaty nonrati-
fiers may enjoy benefits334 or incur burdens335 by virtue of treaty
No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 116; Geneva Convention of July 27th, 1929, for the Relief of the
Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3115, T.I.A.S. No. 3362,
75 U.N.T.S. 62 [hereinafter cited as 1949 Geneva Conventions].
328. See supra text accompanying note 324. See also Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, art. 82, 47 Stat. 2021, 2059, T.S. No. 846, 118
L.N.T.S. 343.
329. 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 227, art. 2 (common to all four conventions)
(emphasis added).
330. See, e.g., Umozurike, The Geneva Conventions and Africa, 7 E. Aa. L.J. 225
(1971).
331. See generally G. voN GLAHN, supra note 261, at 545.
332. See, e.g., Arrow, Prospective Impacts, supra note 10, at 229, 232, 243, 246.
333. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 35.
334. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 36(1). Article 36(1) provides:
A right arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the
treaty intend the provision to accord that right either to third State, or to a group of
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provisions in which sovereigns over particular territories create
permanent servitudes on these territories, in most cases for the
benefit of all. This possibility, analogous to the "convenant running
with the land" approach generally recognized by the common
law, 336 is not controversial, and explains the recognition of rights of
passage through the Suez, 337 Panama, 338 and Kie1339 canals by states
which had not ratified their constitutive instruments. The servitude
creation approach would also explain the binding effect of the
States to which it belongs, or to all States, and the third State assents thereto. Its
assent shall be presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated, unless the treaty
otherwise provides.
Id.
335. A nonratifying state could only incur legally cognizable burdens when a successor
state obtains title to territory upon which a servitude had been validly imposed, or when a
successor state attempts to contest a prior valid, fully-executed boundary disposition. See
generally A. McNAIR, supra note 279, at 256; D. O'CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION
16-17, 49-54 (1956).
336. See, e.g., W. BuRBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 317-18 (3d ed.
1965). A similarity to third-party beneficiary contracts may also be observed. See, e.g, A.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 723-28, 731-35 (1952).
337. While Egypt itself did not sign the Convention of Constantinople on October 29,
1888, which guaranteed nondiscriminatory access to the Suez Canal, the Convention was
signed by the United Kingdom, Turkey, and France, which all had potential claims to
Egypt's ambiguous sovereignty at that time. See generally R. ALBRECHT-CARRIE, A DIPLO-
MATIc HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 110-11, 188 (rev. ed. 1973); J.
KINROSS, THE OTTOMAN CENTURIES 468-546 (1977); J. MAJOR, CIVILIZATION IN THE WESTERN
WORLD, 1715 TO THE PRESENT 345 (1966). (Description of the ambiguity surrounding sover-
eignty over Egypt in the nineteenth century). Their signing of the Convention established a
servitude of nondiscriminatory passage on the Suez Canal analogous to a "covenant running
with the land." See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
338. See Isthmian Canal Convention, Nov. 18, 1903, 31 Martens Nouveau Recueil 599
(2d ser. 1904) (which is subject to similar analysis as the Suez issue, without the ambiguities
pertaining to sovereignty); Treaty between the United Kingdom and the United States of
America relative to the establishment of a communication by Ship Canal between the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Nov. 18, 1901, 30 Martens Nouveau Recueil 631 (2d ser. 1903).
339. See S.S. Wimbledon (Merits), 1923 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 1, at 22 (Judgment of June
28). The P.C.I.J. stated that, pursuant to article 380 of the Versailles Treaty, the Kiel Canal
was intended to become an international waterway for the benefit of all the nations of the
world. Although it may be argued that the court's holding, insofar as it affects the instant
issue of third-party rights and duties, was obiter dicta (since all the parties in that case had
ratified the Versailles Treaty), it is interesting to note the indirect support provided by the
Court to the "servitude" theory: "Whether the German government is bound by virtue of a
servitude or by virtue of a contractural obligation . . . the fact remains that Germany has to
submit to an important limitation of the exercise of . . . sovereign rights . . . over the Kiel
Canal." S.S. Wimbledon, 1923 P.C.I.J. at 24. Cf. A. McNAIR, supra note 304, at 101, 114.
The canal precedents may alternatively be reconciled with sovereignty and consent by
reference to the "concurrent custom" and "intent and acceptance" theories described above.
See supra text accompanying notes 276-317, 318-33.
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nondiscriminatory passage requirements through the Suez Canal on
Egypt, a nonratifier of 1888 Convention of Constantinople. 340 The
I.C.J. has recognized the lasting effect of such servitudes. 341 For
example, in International Status of South-West Africa,342 the I.C.J.
examined the issue of whether the status of the League of Nations-
mandated territories survived the death of the League, and con-
cluded that
[t]heir raison d'etre and original object remain. Since their ful-
fillment did not depend on the existence of the League of Na-
tions, they could not be brought to an end merely because this
supervisory organ ceased to exist. Nor could the right of the
population to have the Territory administered in accordance
with these rules depend thereon. 343
It should be noted that Judge McNair's opinion, in which he based
his conclusion not on the servitude-creating nature of the Mandate,
but on its status as an "objective" regime, 344 was rejected by a
majority of the Court.
Finally, it may be noted that the neutralization precedents,
previously explained pursuant to the "concurrent custom" ap-
proach,3 45 are explicable by the "servitude" theory as well. White-
man defines a neutralized state as
[one] whose independence and integrity are for all time guaran-
teed by an international convention of the powers, under the
condition that such state binds itself never to take up arms
against any other state except for defense against attack, and
never to enter into such international obligations as could indi-
rectly involve it in war.3 46
The reciprocal nature of the obligations entered into upon neutrali-
zation supports the conclusion that, for sufficient consideration, the
340. See supra note 337.
341. Concerning this issue, see generally Legal Consequences for States of the Contin-
ued Presence of South-Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16 (Advisory Opinion of June 21).
342. 1950 I.C.J. 128 (Advisory Opinion of July 11). Concerning other servitude prece-
dents, see generally McNair, So-Called State Servitudes, 6 BaiT. Y.B. INT'L L. 111 (1925).
343. International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. at 133.
344. Id. at 146, 153-55.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 299-307.
346. 1 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 342 (1963) (emphasis added);
see also C. FENWICK, supra note 300, at 89; J. STARKE, supra note 300, at 133-34.
1984]
220 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:169
neutralized state has participated in the imposition of a servitude on
itself.
The servitude creation approach, however, is inapplicable to
deep seabed mining. Since title to the nodules is severable from title
to the seabed 3 47 and the Declaration of Principles only appends the
"common heritage" designation to the seabed,3 48 even were the
appellation sufficiently specific in content to have customary legal
status, no state or group of states would currently have valid title to
the nodules (which are still legally res nullius3 49 ). Consequently, no
state or group of states has the legal right to impose a servitude
upon them. The same conclusion holds true for the seabed itself,
since, as a res communis, it is not subject to ownership, alienation,
or encumberance by any state or states.350 Such an encumberance,
however, could collectively be imposed if the specific provisions35'
of UNCLOS achieve the status of customary international law.
352
4. The "Great Powers" Hypothesis
It has also been suggested that when the leading powers enter
into a treaty or series of treaties embodying a certain rule of law, a
principle of universally binding international law results. 353 Pol-
lock, for example, stated in 1902 that
[t]here is no doubt that, when all or most of the Great Powers
have deliberately agreed to certain rules of general application,
the rules approved by them have very great weight in practice
even among States which have never expressly consented to
them. It is hardly too much to say that declarations of this kind
may be expected, in the absence of prompt and effective dissent
by some Power of the first rank, to become part of the univer-
sally received law of nations within a moderate time.3 54
347. Arrow, The Customary Norm, supra note 51, at 16-21.
348. See supra note 64.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 244-50.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 48-75; Arrow The Customary Norm, supra note
51, at 12-16.
351. For a discussion of these provisions, see supra text accompanying notes 102-217.
352. For a discussion of the prospects, see infra text accompanying notes 439-56.
353. See, e.g., Macrae, supra note 315, at 198, 212. Macrae cites, inter alia, John
Bassett Moore as a relatively recent expositor of this position. Id. at 198 n.91, 212 n.153
(citing J.B. MOORE, Progress of International Law in the Century, in THE COLLECTED PAPERS
OF JOHN BAssErr MOORE 439, 445, 448-49 (1944)).
354. Pollack, The Sources of International Law, 18 LAW Q. REv. 418, 418-19 (1902).
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While this statement may have expressed the state of the law as late
as the early twentieth century, it has been superceded by the newly
emergent principle concerning the sovereign equality of states re-
flected, inter alia, by article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter.
This is not to say, however, that treaties entered into by the great
powers may not have a powerful political impact, or that such
treaties may not acquire a customary legal character with sufficient
acquiescence by other states to establish a "general practice, recog-
nized as binding." 35 5 Finally, this hypothesis, even if currently
valid, could have no impact on seabed law, since many of the great
powers are among the most reluctant participants in the UNCLOS
seabed regime-if they choose to participate at all.
5. Antarctica
The Antarctic Treaty 356 provides a complex precedent due to
several persistent ambiguities concerning, inter alia: the true intent
and capacity of the treaty's framers; whether it exerts any force
upon nonratifying states at all, and, if so, whether such force would
be the result of the treaty's status as an "objective regime," its status
as custom, its intent to bind third-parties and their acquiescence
therein, or its establishment of a servitude on the continent. In
short, every purported "exception" to the res inter alios acta rule
described above (or, for that matter, no exception at all) may be
applied with somewhat inconclusive result. Since the Antarctic
Treaty, however, is the most recent and commonly proffered "ob-
jective regime" precedent, it cannot be ignored. 357 In analyzing this
precedent, however, it is important to recall that those who suggest
the existence of an "objective regime" exception to state sovereignty
355. See I.C.J. STAT. art. 38(1)(b); A. McNAIR, supra note 279, at 259. It has been
suggested that participation by the "specially affected states" (which, coincidentally, includes
most of the "great powers") in the Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S.
No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71, (entered into force June 23, 1961), has rendered it an "objective
regime," binding erga omnes. Because of the significance and complexity of the legal issues
surrounding this treaty it will be considered separately. See infra text accompanying notes
356-88.
356. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 355.
357. An exhaustive and definitive disposition of this precedent is manifestly beyond the
scope of this work.
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bear the burden of its proof, pursuant to the Lotus principle 358 and
the four part customary norm test described above. 35 9
The Antarctic Treaty contains such noncontroversial provi-
sions as a reservation of the continent for peaceful purposes,360
prohibition of nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive
wastes, 36 ' scientific cooperation,362 and a disclaimer of intent to
affect the status of its high seas. 36 3 Article 4 provides that the treaty
is not to be interpreted as effecting the renunciation of pre-existing
claims. It purports to establish that no acts occurring while the
treaty is in force "shall constitute a basis" for asserting new or
enlarged claims to the continent.36 4 The treaty grants to parties
complete freedom of access to Antarctica,36 5 but contains no provi-
sion permitting free access to other continents. It provides for peri-
odic consultations between parties 366 and recognized consultative
states, 36 7 and provides criteria by which the parties may recognize
the consultative status of other states. 36 8 Article 10 provides that
358. See supra note 252.
359. See supra note 274.
360. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 355, art. 1.
361. Id. art. 5.
362. Id. art. 3.
363. Id. art. 6.
364. Id. art. 4. The intent and impact of this provision, which Ambassador Hambro has
characterized as its "most important" article, has given rise to the greatest continuing
controversy. See Hambro, Some Notes on the Future of the Antarctic Treaty Collaboration,
68 Am. J. INT'L L. 217, 219 (1974); Note, A Sometime World of Man: Legal Rights in the
Ross Dependency, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 578, 579 (1971).
365. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 355, art. 7.
366. Id. art. 9(1). Such meetings have occurred at intervals of approximately two years.
367. See infra text accompanying notes 368, 371. While a number of states have
acceded, the granting of consultative rights has been most restrictive. It was only after 16
years that the first new Consultative Party (Poland) was admitted, following the opening of
its Arctowski Base in 1977. See generally, F. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITICS 153
(1982). The Federal Republic of Germany has subsequently been permitted to accede with
Consultative Party status pursuant to the establishment of its new base near Berkner Island,
see id. at 81, 293, and the Democratic Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of
China have evidenced an intention to do the same. See id. at 293. In the early 1960's, the
Netherlands contemplated engaging in unilateral expeditions so as to be able to demand
Consultative Party status, but elected to pursue joint expeditions with Belgium (a party) in
1964 through 1967 instead. See id. at 152.
368. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 355, art. 9(2). Article 9(2) provides for the
recognition of such status when an acceding state "demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by
conducting substantial scientific research activity there, such as the establishment of a
scientific station or the dispatch of a scientific expedition." Id.
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"[e]ach of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate
efforts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the
end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the
principle or purposes of the present Treaty. ' 3 9 The treaty permits
accession by any United Nations member, 370 but permits extension
of consultative status only upon unanimous consent. 37' The treaty is
subject to review after thirty years. 372
It has been suggested that the Treaty text, most particularly
articles 4(2)373 and 10, 374 evidence the intent of its framers to estab-
lish an "objective regime.- 375 As has been observed, however, arti-
cle 4 is much better at specifying what it does not mean than what
it does mean. 376 Although the language of article 4 could be inter-
preted as purporting to bind nonparties, its meaning must be quali-
fied by other treaty provisions rendering all resultant obligations
binding only on its parties upon ratification. 377 Moreover, the ambi-
guity of the language of article 4(2) permits the interpretation that
no new claims shall be asserted by the parties while the treaty is in
force. As Auburn has suggested, article 4 was intended to insure
that the treaty was not to be interpreted as attempting to create an
"objective regime," even assuming the cognizability of such regimes
by customary international law. 378 Concerning the recommenda-
tions contemplated by article 10, Auburn maintains that
[a]ttempts to persuade third parties to observe recommendations
in reliance on Article X would [also] have a very weak basis both
369. Id. art. 10 (emphasis added).
370. Id. art. 13.
371. See id. arts. 9(2), 12.
372. Id. art. 12(2).
373. Article 4(2) reads:
No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sover-
eignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim,
or enlargement of any existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be
asserted while the present Treaty is in force.
Id. art. 4(2) (emphasis added).
374. See supra text accompanying note 369.
375. See, e.g., Antarctic Treaty: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 42-43 (1960) (statement of Mr. Phleger, U.S. Dep't of State).
376. See, e.g., id. at 13, cited in Note, supra note 364, at 579 n.12.
377. See, e.g., Antarctic Treaty, supra note 355, arts. 12, 13.
378. F. AUBURN, supra note 367, at 117-18. Auburn vigorously disputes the cognizabil-
ity of such regimes. Id.
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in general international law and on Treaty practice. It is the
view of the Consultative Parties that effective recommendations
do not bind existing and new Contracting Parties without their
specific acceptance. Once it is admitted that such parties to the
Treaty are not bound by measures which are in force, it is
difficult to assert that third parties should be under any greater
obligation.3 79
Nor does the text of article 10 evidence an intent to bind third
parties. The invocation of the "principles and purposes" language
within that article suggests that the parties themselves were unsure
of their authority. 380 The parties have made no attempt to prevent
the entry of nongovernmental groups and tourists: measures taken
have related exclusively to visits to stations. Moreover, there has
been neither a general agreement nor indication of a desire to
prevent expeditions by third parties. 38' That this attitude is consist-
ent with the drafters' general intent is further supported by the very
cautious statements made by delegates at the 1959 Antarctic Con-
ference. The United Kingdom's representative, Sir Ester Dening,
pointed out, for the benefit of states questioning the treaty's quasi-
legislative appearance, that "it is, in fact, to be almost
entirely a self-denying ordinance on the part of signatories, who
will derive from it virtually no privileges but only obligations. '" 382
Ambassador Scilingo of Argentina also noted that "[t]his confer-
ence . . . has not been convened-to institute regimes or to create
structures. It is not its mission to change or alter anything. 383
Moreover, it must be noted that the absence of administration over
the continent as a whole is a feature of the purported "regime"
which persists to the present day. 3 4
379. Id. at 120 (citation omitted); see also id. at 166.
380. Id. at 119-20. Moreover, article 10 requires that the efforts of each Contracting
Party (undertaken to insure compliance by all contrary to the Treaty's "principles or pur-
poses") be "consistent with the Charter of the United Nations," Antarctica Treaty, supra note
355, art. 10, which itself does not authorize the binding impact of regional arrangements on
nonparties. See, e.g., F. AUBURN, supra note 367, at 117.
381. F. AuaURN, supra note 367, at 129. But see supra note 367; infra note 385.
382. Conference on Antarctica (Washington), Doe. No. 15, at 1-4 (Oct. 15, 1959)
[hereinafter cited as Antarctic Conference Papers], cited in Hayton, The Antarctic Settle-
ment of 1959, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 349, 356 n.25 (1960).
383. Antarctic Conference Papers, supra note 382, at 1-2, cited in Hayton, supra note
382, at 355 n.24.
384. Nor could there be any effective administration in the continent as a whole
(pursuant to the Treaty) concerning such vital issues as economics or resource exploitation.
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Neither the text nor the application of the Antarctic Treaty
evidences either an unambiguous intent to bind third parties or a
general forebearance by states to act, based on their perception that
the Treaty is an "objective regime." For this reason, it is unlikely
that the Treaty in any way binds nonratifying states.
It may be argued, however, that the Antarctic Treaty has
become binding as custom. It is true that there has never been any
concerted effort by a significant group to oppose it.3 85 Nevertheless,
even if whatever "regime" has been established by the treaty has
now achieved customary legal status3 6 such a conclusion would in
no way support the existence of an exception to the res inter alios
acta rule. The same may be said, of course, about any Antarctic
Such issues, of course, are not dealt with at all within the four corners of the Treaty. See,
e.g., Hambro, supra note 364, at 221. Concerning subsequent recommendations of the
consultative parties, see supra text accompanying note 379. Concerning the likelihood of
protest to such a potential regime, see infra note 386. Moreover, any attempt by the
Consultative Parties to license mineral exploitation would likely constitute an attempt to
exercise sovereignty in violation of article 4 of the Treaty itself. See Hambro, supra note 364,
at 223.
385. F. AUBURN, supra note 373, at 293. However, claimstaking has occurred even after
the Treaty entered into force. See J. HENDERSON, ONE FOOT ON THE POLE 59 (1962). An
unauthorized expedition was conducted by the Italians on King George Island in 1976. F.
AUBURN, supra note 367, at 116. Moreover, when Brazil announced plans for an unauthor-
ized expedition in 1972, the Consultative Parties were unsure of any basis on which it could
be stopped. See id. at 128. While Brazil and Italy later acceded to the Treaty, its perception
(by then nonratifiers) as opinio juris remains unclear. See supra note 274. But cI. K.
HOLLOWAY, supra note 296, at 592-96. Holloway appears to take the position that some
portions of the Treaty have not only coalesced into binding customary norms, but perhaps jus
cogens as well. Id. Cf. supra note 273. (discussing jus cogens doctrine).
386. In addition to the sovereign claims based upon discovery and exploration deferred
but not renounced in 1959 by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New
Zealand, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States (original ratifiers of the
Antarctic Treaty), and similar potential claims deferred but not renounced by Germany and
Poland by virtue of their subsequent accessions, sector theory claims have been advanced by
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and potentially, by Uruguay, all of which, similarly, have been
deferred but not renounced. Excellent succinct histories of the "discovery and exploration"
claims may be found in F. AUBURN, supra note 367, at 1-3; R. HUNTFORD, Scor AND
AMUNDSEN 4-11 (1979); Hayton, supra note 382, at 350-54; Scott, Arctic Exploration and
International Law, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 928, 929-39 (1909). Descriptions of the Antarctic sector
claims may be found in F. AUBURN, supra note 367, at 17-38, 59, 67, 73, 105. Auburn notes
that, as a matter of theoretical geography, similar claims could be made by Brazil, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. Id.- at 24. African and
Asian States may also be able to make such claims. The derivation of the "sector theory" is
explored in H. KUSHNER, CONFLICT ON THE NORTHWEST COAST 32-33 (1975). Concerning the
likelihood of protest to any arguably emergent Antarctic customary regime by the Interna-
tional seabed Authority, the Group of 77, oil producing states, or others, see, e.g., F.
AUBURN, supra note 367, at 293.
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Treaty force based on the "intent and acceptance"3 87 or "servi-
tude" 388 theories described above.
6. UNCLOS
Given the historical and contemporary notions of sovereignty
evidenced by state practice, the inability of any treaty to establish
an "objective regime" binding erga omnes should now be estab-
lished. While UNCLOS, in many respects, represents a codification
of prior customary international law,3 89 and in some cases, a pro-
gressive development now probably on its way to establishing new
customary norms, 390 this cannot be said of UNCLOS' seabed re-
gime. This is due, inter alia, to its conflict with longstanding no-
tions of the freedoms of the seas, 391 the absence of widespread
387. See supra text accompanying notes 318-33. The application of this theory to the
Antarctic Treaty is impossible due to the unanimous consent requirements found in articles
12 and 13. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 355, arts. 12, 13. Cf. supra text accompanying
notes 367-71 (consultative status).
388. See supra text accompanying notes 334-52. It has been suggested that the servitude
theory might be applied, provided that the parties to the Antarctic Treaty collectively
possessed sovereignty over the continent at the time of its entry into force in 1961. Certainly,
precedent exists that relatively minimal incidents of occupation and administration by the
Antarctic powers might suffice to perfect any inchoate title acquired upon discovery, see,
e.g., Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 846 (1928), due to the
"[a]rctic and inaccessible character" of the region involved. See, e.g., Legal Status of Eastern
Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, at 22, 50-51 (Judgment of Apr. 5).
Certainly, Antarctica meets these criteria, as it has no land vertebrates, no trees, and all three
flowering plants are recent and marginal invaders. G. LLANO, THE TERRESTRIAL LIFE OF THE
ANTARCTIC 3 (1962). The temperatures of even the most favored coastal areas of the Antarctic
Peninsula are only above freezing for about four months of the year. CENT. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, POLAR REGIONS ATLAS 37 (1979). Nevertheless, because sovereignty over the conti-
nent is disputed between the Antarctic powers themselves, it can hardly be maintained that a
servitude-based regime exists binding third-party nonratifying states. F. AUBURN, supra note
367, at 118. By way of distinction, Danish claims in Greenland had gone uncontested for over
500 years. Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. at 46. This same fact also distinguishes the
Spitzbergen precedent, see, e.g., Lansing, A Unique International Problem, 11 Am. J. INT'L
L. 763 (1917), because one state, Norway, had recognized territorial therein, See, e.g.,
Hambro, supra note 364, at 224. Finally, the absence of an intent to create a permanent
servitude is evidenced by article 4(1) of the Treaty itself, which disclaims an intent by the
parties to renounce any preexistent claims. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 355, art. 4(1).
389. See generally Arrow, Prospective Impacts, supra note 10, passim.
390. The recognition given by UNCLOS to the exclusive economic zone is especially
noteworthy in this respect. See UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 55-75. But see, e.g., McDougal,
Some Comments, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE, supra note 31, at 79.
391. See supra text accompanying notes 244-50.
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ratification, and the active and continual protest of many of the
"specifically affected states. ' 39 2
UNCLOS itself also contains provisions which indicate that it
is not intended to attempt to create an "objective regime." It is
subject to both ratification39 3 and denunciation. 394 In its article
dealing with its relation to other treaties and conventions,
UNCLOS provides that "[t]his Convention shall prevail, as be-
tween States Parties, over the Geneva Conventions on the Law of
the Sea of 29 April 1958." 39 5 Concerning state declarations made at
the UNCLOS adoption ceremony in Montego Bay, Lee has written
that the various statements "are in keeping with a plausible pre-
sumption that the Convention was not intended to provide rights
[and presumably, a fortiori, duties] for third states. Virtually all
states participated in the conference, and the Convention was
drafted and negotiated with a view to obtaining adherence by all
states."
398
UNCLOS, as a result, is unlikely ever to be recognized as an
"objective regime," except by way of obiter dicta in a future deci-
sion which will undoubtedly be more narrowly explicable based on
UNCLOS' prospective status as customary international law.
C. Estoppel
The prospective effect of UNCLOS' seabed provisions as a new
"objective regime" is consequently nil,3 9 7 and the effect of such
provisions as future international custom is speculative at best. 3 8
Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether the United States
may become bound by those provisions, due to its signature to the
UNCLOS III Final Act, or to any subsequent express acquiescence
in UNCLOS' terms. Alternatively, due to the "package" nature of
the UNCLOS III negotiations 399 and the "package deal" explicit in
392. See supra text accompanying notes 218-43.
393. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 306.
394. Id. art. 317.
395. Id. art. 311 (emphasis added).
396. Lee, supra note 297, at 548; see also Marshall, supra note 171, at 9. See generally
Lee, supra note 297, at 549-51; inJra note 399.
397. See supra text accompanying notes 244-96.
398. See generally supra note 274; supra text accompanying notes 389-92; infra note
404; infra text accompanying notes 439-67.
399. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Rules of Procedure, 31
U.N. GAOR Supp (No. 12) at 18, U.N. Doe. A/CONF .62/30/Rev. 2 (1976). Ambassador
Arias-Schreiber of Peru, speaking for the Group of 77, stated to the 183d Plenary Meeting on
September 22, 1982, that:
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text of UNCLOS itself,400 might the United States be estopped from
denying the seabeds provisions' validity if it attempted to exercise
navigational or non-seabed resource rights available pursuant to
UNCLOS but not pursuant to customary international law? These
questions raise complex and overlapping issues which require de-
tailed exploration.
1. Estoppel by Signature or Preliminary Consent
While some commentary supporting a broader principle exists,
article 18 of the Vienna Convention 40 1 resolves this issue as follows:
A state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty when:
a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments consti-
tuting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval
until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party
to the treaty; or
b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending
the entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry
into force is not unduly delayed. 402
For purposes of clarity, paragraph (a) of article 18 will be referred
to as the "estoppel by signature" provision, and paragraph (b) will
be referred to as its "estoppel by preliminary consent" component.
Even assuming that article 18 states a customary international
norm, the United States would not be estopped from contesting
UNCLOS' provisions by virtue of its signature to any instrument.
The United States, while signing the UNCLOS III Final Act 40 3
The "package deal" approach ruled out any selective application of the Convention.
... [N]o State or group of States could lawfully claim rights . . . by reference to
individual provisions of the Convention unless that State or group of States were
themselves parties to the Convention. States which decided to become parties to the
Convention would likewise be under no obligation to apply its provisions vis-a-vis
States that were not parties.
UNCLOS III, Summary Record of the 183d Plenary Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
SR.183, at 3-4 (prov. ed. 1982). He reiterated this position at Montego Bay on Dec. 6, 1982,
and was specifically supported by the representatives of Canada, Cameroon, Tanzania,
Indonesia, Iran, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Lee, supra note 297, at 547
n.18.
400. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 309. But see id. art. 310.
401. Supra note 7.
402. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 18 (emphasis added).
403. Supra note 1.
SEABEDS
(which merely affirmed the nature and dates of the negotiations
and the authenticity of the finally adopted UNCLOS text), did not
sign UNCLOS itself.40 4 The estoppel by signature provision, there-
fore, is irrelevant to the United States.
While Carter administration spokesmen had expressed the
hope and expectation that a satisfactory text would result from the
Tenth (Geneva/New York) Negotiating Session in 1981, this would
undoubtedly fall short of the express consent to be bound (by a
treaty whose terms had not as yet been fixed) required by the
"estoppel by preliminary consent" paragraph. Nevertheless, pursu-
ant to his March 10, 1983 proclamation of an exclusive economic
zone for the United States, President Reagan also presented the
following statement as United States policy towards ocean law,
assuming future United States nonparticipation in the UNCLOS
regime:
First, the United States is prepared to act in accordance with the
balance of interests relating to the traditional uses of the
oceans-such as navigation and overflight. In this respect, the
United States will recognize the right of other states in waters off
their coasts, as reflected in the Convention, so long as the rights
and freedoms of the United States and others under interna-
tional law are recognized by such coastal states.
Second, the United States will exercise and assert its navigational
and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a
manner that is consistent with the balance of interests that is
reflected in the convention. The United States will not, how-
ever, acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to
restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community
in navigation and overflight and other related high seas uses. 405
This statement, and the policy it represents, may have signifi-
cant ramifications for any potential future United States estoppel to
deny the validity of various UNCLOS provisions. For purposes of
the "estoppel by preliminary consent" approach, the statement falls
404. Twenty-two of the other 139 states signing the Final Act on September 10, 1982
did not sign UNCLOS at that time, including Belgium, Ecuador, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Peru, Spain, the United Kingdom, Venezuela,
and Zaire. See 21 I.L.M. 1477 (1982).
405. 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRas. Docs. 383 (Mar. 14, 1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983
Reagan statement].
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short of preliminary consent to UNCLOS as a whole, being limited
to navigational and coastal state jurisdictional rights. Even con-
cerning those rights, the statement is couched in reciprocal terms.
Moreover, the reference to "high seas," near the end of the quoted
portion, creates another ambiguity, since the United States (along
with about two dozen other states) persists in claiming a three-mile
territorial sea. 40 Thus, the United States might contend that it was
not estopped from denying the validity of UNCLOS' critical 40 7
straits provisions, 40 since the President's statement does not specifi-
cally acquiesce in their removal from high seas status. 409
2. Estoppel by Assertion of UNCLOS-Based Rights
If the United States attempted to assert non-customary
UNCLOS-based rights, but denied its concomitant "trade-offs" or
duties, a broader estoppel argument with wider equitable-and
possibly legal-appeal might apply. The estoppel concept is recog-
nized by international courts 410 as a "general principle of law recog-
nized by civilized nations."' 41 While this particular political reflec-
tion of the estoppel principle has not as yet been specifically
406. Dep't of State, Office of the Geographer, Summary of Coastal State Claims (Nov.
15, 1982) (mimeo) (updating LIMITS IN THE SEAS No. 36: NATIONAL CLAIMS TO MARITIME
JURISDICTIONS (4th rev. ed. 1981)), cited in Lee, supra note 297, at 551 n.37. These states,
including, inter alia, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and Australia, are likely to constitute several of the "specially affected
states." See generally supra note 274.
407. With UNCLOS' attempted shift from the three mile territorial sea, see supra note
48, to 12 miles, see UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 3, approximately 116 straits, including
Gibraltar, Molucca, Singapore, Hormuz, and Tiran, would no longer be wide enough to
permit a strip of high seas to run down the middle. As Ambassador Richardson has noted:
"[T]he legal right to overfly a strait could be gained only with coastal state consent . . . and
surface vessels would be subject to varying assertions of coastal-state regulatory power."
Richardson, Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 902, 905 (1980).
408. UNCLOS' straits regime is contained in UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 34-45, and is
discussed further in Arrow, Prospective Impacts, supra note 10, at 243, 244, and infra text
accompanying notes 414-18, 481-84.
409. Regarding the effect of protest against such a result by the specially affected states
enumerated in supra note 406, see supra notes 195, 254, 274. For a synopsis of the antecedent
customary norms assuring free passage through international straits, see Lee, supra note 297,
at 555-56. See generally supra text accompanying notes 337, 340, concerning international
canals.
410. See, e.g., Chorzow Factory (Merits) (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 17
(Judgment of Sept. 13).
411. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38(1)(c).
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applied, there is a manifest inequity in attempting to have the
"quid without the quo." 412 This, moreover, was the essence on
UNCLOS III's "package deal" approach 413-an approach of which
the United States was well aware when it extracted coastal state
jurisdictional limitations and arguable flag state navigational bene-
fits during UNCLOS III's ten-year negotiating duration.
Such an estoppel can be avoided through careful analysis by
the United States of the state of customary international law prior
to UNCLOS, and by asserting rights only pursuant thereto, or to
rights specifically enjoyed vis-a-vis a particular state pursuant to
bilateral or multilateral agreements.
The United States position concerning UNCLOS-defined navi-
gational rights is that such rights existed prior to UNCLOS any-
way. 414 This conclusion, with a caveat regarding prior ambiguity as
to the nature of "innocent passage, ' 415 is probably correct. The
developing state perspective is antithetical, and suggests that straits
and archipelagic sea lanes passage present examples of UNCLOS
navigational provisions' greater permissiveness than the norms of
antecedent customary international law. 416 However, broad straits
passage rights were recognized in both the Corfu Channel 417 case
and the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
412. See generally Lee, supra note 297, at 566.
413. See supra note 399.
414. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 297, at 542 n.3.
415. Article 14 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr.
29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1610, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force
Sept. 10, 1964), provided generally that passage was innocent so long as it was not prejudicial
to the peace, good order, and security of the coastal state, and otherwise legal. Id. art. 14.
Prior customary law was not completely clear concerning the precise ramifications of this
approach, and coastal states have occasionally exploited the ambiguity of these criteria to
deny passage based on its purpose, destination, cargo, or flag. See M. McDOUGAL &
W. ButxE, supra note 4, at 231; Arrow, Prospective Impacts, supra note 10, at 243. More-
over, although article 24 of the Convention on Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
supra, at least impliedly guarantees a right of innocent passage to warships, id. art 24, this
right has not been universally recognized. See, e.g., Pirtle, Transit Rights and U.S. Security
Interests: The "Straits debate" Re-Visited, 5 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 477, 481-82 (1978). The
UNCLOS regime is more specific concerning the criteria for "innocence," and specifically
permits passage by warships and plans through straits and by warships through the territorial
sea. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 17, 19, 24, 29, 30, 37-39.
416. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/PV. 193, at 23-25 (1983) (statement of Ambassa-
dor Tommy Koh, President of UNCLOS III, made in closing the Conference on December
10, 1982).
417. (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Order of July 31).
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Zone, 418 and the concept of "archipelagic waters" was unknown to
customary international law prior to UNCLOS. 419
Concerning resource jurisdiction, a different initial inquiry
must be invoked. If the protest principle may shield the industrial-
ized powers from the application of "common heritage" principles
to the seabed and its resources, 42 0 may it not also shield coastal
states from UNCLOS' jurisdictional limitations? 421 An affirmative
answer would permit coastal state sovereign claims to 500, 1000, or
2000 miles, effectively placing all of the seabeds' resources within
coastal state jurisdiction.
The answer, of course, lies in the freedom of the seas doctrine
itself which, though its radiation has waned with increased accept-
ance of coastal state jurisdictional claims, has yet to reach the point
of total invisibility. President Reagan's position, refusing to acqui-
esce in the restriction of high seas freedoms, may be justified by
reference to this doctrine, as would a refusal to acquiesce in the
further nationalization of more area formerly possessing high seas
status. The perpetuation of an alternative seabed mining approach
is yet another reflection of United States protest over the piecemeal
desiccation of the freedoms of the seas. Nevertheless, the United
States has itself participated therein by declaring its own 200 mile
exclusive economic zone. To that extent, the United States would be
estopped from denying the validity of any such zone proclaimed by
a state which reciprocally recognizes that of the United States. 422
D. Satisfaction of "Common Heritage" Requirements
As has been indicated, the specific reflections of the "common
heritage" principle 423 contained in the detail of UNCLOS have not
achieved cognizability as customary international law. 424 Neverthe-
less, whatever particulars are specified by the Declaration of Princi-
418. Supra note 415.
419. See UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 46-54. Such waters would have been high seas
past the three mile limit, unless the archipelagic state would have been permited to draw
straight baselines in accord with the principles set forth in Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951
I.C.J. 116, 28-32 (Judgment of Dec. 18).
420. See, e.g., supra notes 195, 254.
421. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 3, 57, 76.
422. Concerning the jurisdictional possibilities, see infra text accompanying note 427.
423. See generally supra text accompanying notes 59-76.
424. See supra text accompanying notes 314-17.
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pies425 have probably achieved such status as a result, inter alia of
the unanimous adoption of the Declaration in 1970. Two such
particulars are relevant for purposes of seabed mineral exploitation
other than as is protected by UNCLOS: the preclusion of sovereign
claims; 426 and the requirement that exploitation be carried out "for
the benefit of mankind as a whole, . . taking into particular
consideration the interests and needs of developing countries.
4 27
Clearly, all the reciprocating states meet the former criterion, since
they base their mining legislation on citizenship and not territorial
jurisdiction. 42 18 Concerning the second criterion, the United States,
United Kingdom, France, and Federal Republic of Germany all
provide for deepsea mining funds, 42 9 with various methods of dis-
bursement 430 to attempt accommodation of the "special consider-
ation" provisions described above. 43' Japan, while maintaining
some flexibility for future administrative regulation by MITI, 43
2
does not establish a revenue sharing fund, apparently in the belief
either that the "common heritage" principle (even in its broadest
possible application) does not reflect an extant customary norm, or
that seabed mineral exploitation is ipso facto for the benefit of all
425. See supra note 64.
426. See supra text accompanying note 66; see also supra text accompanying notes 55-
57.
427. Declaration of Principles, supra note 64, paras. 7, 9.
428. See U.S. Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1402 (Supp. IV 1980); Japanese Act ch. 4, art. 2
reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 102 (1983); U.K. Act, 1981, ch. 53, § 3(1), (2), reprinted in 20 I.L.M.
1218, 1220 (1981); West German Act, § 3, BGB1 1 1457 (W. Ger.).
429. The United States, United Kingdom, and West German Acts effectively impose a
tax of 0.75% of the value of the recovered metals. U.S. Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4995, 4997 (Supp.
IV 1980); 30 U.S.C. § 1472 (Supp. IV 1980); U.K. Act, 1981, ch. 53, § 9(1)(b), reprinted in
20 I.L.M. 1218, 1222 (1981); West German Act, § 12, 1980 BCB1 1 1457 (W. Ger.). The
French tax is 3.75%. French Act, art. 12, 1981 J.O. 3499, 1982 D.S.L. 12.
430. The United States establishes a trust fund, which may be made available to the
I.S.A. should the United States ratify UNCLOS before June 28, 1990. If no such ratification
occurs, the fund "shall be available for such purposes as Congress may hereafter provide by
law." U.S. Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1472(d), (e) (Supp. IV 1980). The approach of the United
Kingdom is to permit its Secretary of State to transfer funds to the I.S.A., provided that it has
ratified UNCLOS by July 28, 1991. U.K. Act, 1981, ch. 53, § 10, reprinted in 20 I.L.M.
1218, 1222-23. The West German approach also permits transfer of its trust fund to the
I.S.A. upon its ratification of UNCLOS, but mandates its investment for foreign aid purposes
in the interim. West German act, § 13, 1980 BGBI 11457 (W. Ger.). Although article 12 of
the French Act, art. 12, 1981 J.O. 3499, 1982 D.S.L. 12, does not specify the use of it fund, a
subsequent finance act adopts the approach of creating a special fund for aid to developing
states. 1982 Finance Act, art. 50 1981 J.O. 3539.
431. See supra text accompanying note 427.
432. See Japanese Act, ch. 4, art. 33; supra note 222.
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and the developing states in particular, and that no revenue sharing
is therefore required. 433 Lest this characterization seem compara-
tively cavalier, it must be noted that, due to the tentative nature of
revenue sharing in the United States' and United Kingdom's legisla-
tion, the same effective result could obtain pursuant to either of
their regimes as well. 434
Japan, of course, is not alone in maintaining that deep seabed
mining is ipso facto for the common good, irrespective of the ab-
sence of revenue sharing. Robert Goldwin points out that
[t]he underlying theme first was enunciated by Arvid Pardo, the
Maltese delegate to the United Nations in 1967. 13 Ambassador
Pardo was the first in the United Nations to use the phrase
"common heritage of mankind" to describe the deep seas, and he
is the one who described the task as a race between the "good for
one" (meaning the nation-state acting in its own selfish interest)
and "the common good" (meaning the United Nations and other
international organizations).
But why should we, the United States, and other examplers
of the democratic-capitalist system, agree to such a distinction?
It should be made clear to the rest of the world as it is (or should
be) to us that what justifies encouragement to private enterprises
is that all of society benefits. 436
To say the least, however, the "trickle down" theory is less-
than-universally accepted. Moreover, it is likely that it is less-at
least to most of the Declaration of Principles' proponents-than
they thought they were requiring by stipulating that seabed mineral
exploitation be carried out "for the benefit of mankind as a whole,
taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of the
developing countries."'437 Pursuant to this requirement, the French
and West German approaches are the likeliest to pass international
legal muster; the United States' and United Kingdom's approaches
somewhat less likely; and the Japanese approach, unlikely at this
point. 438
433. Japanese Act, ch. 4, art. 1.
434. See supra note 430.
435. See supra note 54.
436. Goldwin, Locke and the Law of the Sea, 71 COMMENTARY 46, 49 (1983).
437. For the text of the Declaration, see Declaration of Principles, supra note 64, at 24.
438. Cf. supra notes 429, 430 (United States, United Kingdom, French and West
German approaches). All this assumes again, of course, that any international adjudicative
body could become. seized of an appropriate international dispute. See infra text accompany-
ing note 459.
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IV. POTENTIAL SCENARIOS
A. Scenarios for UNCLOS
One hundred and seventeen states signed UNCLOS at Mon-
tego Bay on December 10, 1982 and several more have signed it
since then. 430 Although comparatively few states have ratified it
thus far, UNCLOS will come into force for its parties 12 months
after the sixtieth ratification has been deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. 440 In the meanwhile, the UNCLOS
III Final Act 44' establishes 442 a Preparatory Commission for the
I.S.A. and for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 443
which is to be composed of the states which sign or accede to
UNCLOS. The Commission is empowered, inter alia, to select its
chairman and other officers, 444 prepare and suggest the first Assem-
bly and Council agenda, 445 prepare draft rules of procedure, 446 and
to make recommendations generally. 447 In addition, the Commis-
sion is to exercise the powers necessary to effectuate the regime for
the protection of pioneer investors, 44 and is authorized to create
commissions on the Enterprise 44 and on the effect of seabed mining
on land-based mineral producing states. 45 0 The Commission's ex-
penses are to be paid from the regular U.N. budget, 45' and the
Commission is given the capacity necessary to achieve its mandates
and goals. 452 Final Act signatories and national liberation move-
ments may participate in Commission activities as observers. 453
439. See, e.g., 21 I.L.M. 1477 (1982).
440. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 308(1), 319(1).
441. See supra note 1.
442. Resolution I, supra note 135.
443. UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex 6.
444. Resolution I, supra note 135, para. 3.
445. Id. para. 5(a).
446. Id. para. 5(b).
447. Id. para. 5(c)-(e), (i), 10.
448. Id. para. 8. Concerning the Pioneer Investment Protection regime, see Resolution
II, supra note 133 passim, discussed in supra text accompanying notes 132-51.
449. Resolution I, supra note 135, para. 8. Paragraph 8 allows this Commission to "take
all measures necessary for the early entry into effective operation of the Enterprise." Id. For a
discussion of the Enterprise, see supra text accompanying notes 78-91.
450. Resolution I, supra note 135, para. 9.
451. This is subject to General Assembly approval. Id. para. 14.
452. Id. para. 6.
453. Id. para. 2.
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The Preparatory Commission came into effect on December
10, 1982, the date of the fiftieth signature to the UNCLOS Final
Act. 454 It first assembled on March 15, 1983, selected Joseph Y.
Warioba of Tanzania as its President, and began a process, likely to
take several years, of implementing the seabed mining provisions of
UNCLOS.
455
It is contemplated that the Preparatory Commission will be
composed largely of legal and technical experts, and it is expected
to meet frequently during the years while UNCLOS is being rati-
fied to create the machinery of the I.S.A. If quick ratification of
UNCLOS is procured (only sixty ratifiers are needed to bring it into
force inter se 456), the I.S.A. could open for business by 1990, with
seabed mining commencing by about 1992.
B. Scenarios for the "Alternative" Seabed Regime
As has been indicated, the Reagan Administration has decided,
if necessary, to "go it alone" in the area of ocean law, thereby
avoiding the strictures of the UNCLOS regime. 457 In addition to
pursuance of its "alternative" seabed regime, the Administration
continues to pursue bilateral arrangements, particularly with re-
gard to its navigational interests in straits. 458 Politically (and le-
gally 459), the future of the "alternative" regime, as such, 460 is un-
454. Id. para. 1.
455. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 171, at 8.
456. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 308.
457. See generally supra text accompanying notes 44-243. A description of the evolution
of Reagan Administration policy can be found in Wertenbaker-II, supra note 116, at 69-80.
458. See Marshall, supra note 171, at 10.
459. But see supra notes 195, 254, 274 (concerning the effect of protest by a "specially
affected state" against a newly emergent customary norm). Although the United States could
validly (if not in good faith) invoke its Connally Reservation, reprinted in L. HENKIN, supra
note 313, at 862, so as to preclude the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. over the legal issues in a
contentious case involving the United States, see Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.),
1957 I.C.J. 9 (Judgment of July 6), such issues could likely be raised by the General Assembly
pursuant to the Court's power to grant advisory opinions. See U.N. CHARTER art. 96; see
generally D. PRATAP, THE ADvisoRY JURISDIcTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 55-226 (1972)
(advisory proceedings institution, jurisdiction, and procedure). Although there may be cir-
cumstances in which the Court would decline such jurisdiction, it has held in Peace Treaties
with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, 1950 I.C.J. 65, 72 (Advisory Opinion of Mar. 30 and
July 18), that, in principle, such requests should not be refused. Id. See also Certain Expenses
of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 155 (Advisory Opinion of July 20); D. PRATAP, supra,
at 146-51 (duty of the Court as a judicial organ and discretionary power to grant advisory
opinion). Concerning the nonbinding character of such opinions, see id. at 227-34; cf. I.C.J.
STAT. art. 59.
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clear, since two of the potentially reciprocating states-France and
Japan-have already signed (and may well ratify) UNCLOS.
While neither the United Kingdom nor the Federal Republic of
Germany has signed or ratified UNCLOS, there are powerful in-
ducements for them to do so.461 Moreover, both continue to hedge
their bets by participating as observers in the work of the Prepara-
tory Commission. 462  Should these "specially affected states" 46 3
choose to ratify UNCLOS, their ratification would significantly
enhance UNCLOS' prospects for subsequent recognition as custom-
ary international law.46 4 In addition, such ratification carries con-
comitant obligations to finance the Enterprise pursuant to the terms
of UNCLOS, 46 , and to terminate their recognition of non-
UNCLOS-granted licenses pursuant to the terms of their own do-
mestic legislation. 466 Their ratification, therefore, would also en-
hance the possibility of international conflict over mining areas,
increasing the possibility of international litigation, and decreasing
the security of investments by United States miners and investors.
Political instability, of course, could perpetuate the insecurity of
investment problem, even assuming the strength of the United
States' legal position .467
460. See supra text accompanying notes 218-23.
461. Although both governments share many philosophical reservations concerning
UNCLOS with the United States, the United Kingdom would benefit from the certainty
provided by UNCLOS' outer continental shelf provisions, and the Federal Republic of
Germany would be the seat of the Law of the Sea Tribunal should it choose to ratify. See
generally UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 76 & Annexes 2, 6.
462. See generally supra notes 414-27.
463. See supra note 274.
464. It has been noted that the states abstaining or voting "no" on the UNCLOS final
text contributed about 60% of the United Nations' total budget. See, e.g., Marshall, supra
note 171, at 8, 12. While some of these states have subsequently chosen to sign the treaty,
absence of general ratification or acceptance of its provisions, or such inaction by the
"specially affected states," would, of course, be dispositive concerning the treaty's status as
custom.
465. See supra text accompanying notes 176-88.
466. See French Act, art. 1, 1981 J.O. 3499, 1982 D.S.L. 11; Japanese Act, ch. 4, art
43; U.K. Act, 1981, ch. 53, § 18(3),(4), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1218, 1226 (1981); West
German Act, § 5(1), 1980 BGB1 11457 (W. Ger.); see also U.S. Act; 30 U.S.C. § 1442 (Supp.
IV 1982) (effect of international agreement).
467. For arguments supporting the legal position of the United States, see, e.g., Arrow,
The Customary Norm, supra note 51, at 1-38; Arrow, The Proposed Regime, supra note 4, at
350-94; supra notes 195, 254, 274, 431. Accord McDougal, supra note 390, at 79, 83. Contra
Biggs, Deep Seabed Mining and Unilateral Legislation, 8 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 223 (1980);
Carias, Seabed Mining in the Informal 1980 Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE, supra note 31, at 37.
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C. Benefits and Detriments of Unilateralism
The primary benefit to the United States of pursuing an alter-
native (i.e., non-UNCLOS) oceans policy lies, of course, in avoid-
ing both its seabed regulatory approach, and obligations to finan-
cially support the International Seabed Authority to the extent of
about 25% of its annual budget for at least fifteen years. 4 8 More-
over, the United States would be required, directly or indirectly, to
provide financial assistance to the International Enterprise which
could potentially cost up to U.S.$500 million or more.46 9
The refusal of the United States and its allies to participate in
the UNCLOS regime may have a deterrent effect on other states'
ratification, because the financial obligation to put the Enterprise
in business would devolve on those states which chose to ratify.
UNCLOS requires revenue sharing from continental shelf resources
recovered by a coastal state more than 200 nautical miles from its
coast 47 0-an obligation which, according to some estimates, has
been placed as high as U.S.$3.5 billion annually for the United
States. 471
Perhaps of greatest importance (at least to the Reagan Admin-
istration) are the advantages of pure principle: the negation of
collectivist principles' application to about half the surface of the
earth, and the preservation of the United States' sovereignty against
prospective encroachment by a quasi-legislative assembly of states
at the UNCLOS review conference in about the year 2010.472
A permanent end to "creeping" coastal state jurisdiction would
certainly be one of the primary benefits of adherence to the
UNCLOS regime. UNCLOS clearly limits the territorial sea juris-
diction of a coastal state to twelve nautical miles, 473 and while
arguments have been made that the 1958 Convention on the Terri-
468. See supra text accompanying notes 177-80.
469. See supra text accompanying notes 182-87.
470. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 82(1)(2).
471. See Marshall, supra note 171, at 10. Of course, such continental shelf claims might
not be internationally cognizable at all pursuant to the criteria established by article 1 of the
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 473, T.I.A.S. No.
5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 312 (entered into force June 10, 1964). See generally, North Sea
Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of Feb. 20); Wertenbaker-II,
supra note 116, at 57-58.
472. See supra text accompanying notes 48-217.
473. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 3.
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torial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 474 by implication, does the same,
state practice has not been consistent with this interpretation. 475
The International Court of Justice has not helped to resolve the
creeping jurisdiction problem, since it based its decision in the 1974
Fisheries Jurisdiction476 case on a United Kingdom-Iceland treaty,
not on customary international law. 477
While the United States and others have maintained their
protest to the existence of territorial seas beyond the three-mile
limit,478 a permanent political solution is certainly preferable to
multitudinous bilateral arrangements, or to the use of military
force. Absent United States participation in UNCLOS, creeping
coastal state jurisdictional assertions would likely take the form of
expanded claims to territorial seas, or to broader rights in the
economic zone, including the right to prevent military 49 or re-
search 480 uses of such zones.
Coastal states might also attempt to impose vessel standards
more rigorous than IMCO standards (which are considered the
maximum required pursuant to UNCLOS) for territorial sea or
economic zone passage. 48' For example, at the Eleventh Negotiat-
ing Session of UNCLOS III in 1982, Gabon proposed that warships
be precluded from entering the territorial sea without notice to or
permission of the coastal state, and Spain presented four proposals
demanding more rigorous pollution control requirements in straits.
Such claims, as well as exponentially increased coastal state juris-
dictional claims, could well proliferate absent United States partici-
pation in the UNCLOS regime.
474. Apr. 29, 1958, art. 24(2), 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1612, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S.
205 [hereinafter cited as Convention on the Territorial Sea].
475. See generally II G.R. CHURCHILL, M. NoRDQUIST, & S. LAY, NEW DIRECTIONS IN
THE LAW OF THE SEA 835-54 (1977).
476. (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of July 25).
477. Id.
478. See supra text accompanying notes 405-06.
479. Alexander, Cameron & Nixon, The Costs of Failure at the Third Law of the Sea
Conference, 9 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 1, 18 (1977). See also supra note 415 (ambiguities in right
to passage).
480. Grolin, The Future of the Law of the Sea-Consequences of a Non-Treaty or Non-
Universal Treaty Situation, 13 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 1, 11 (1983). Cf. UNCLOS, supra note
1, arts. 244-264, 297, discussed in Arrow, Prospective Impacts, supra note 10, at 236-38. Of
course, the United States might forcibly resist such claims based on the 1958 High Seas
Convention, supra note 3, art. 2.
481. Grolin, supra note 480, at 11.
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A further detriment of unilateralism by the United States re-
lates to its navigational interest in straits. While the United States
position that customary international law requires free passage
through straits is strong, 482 and UNCLOS' provisions may not un-
conditionally guarantee such passage, 483 the general international
perception of the UNCLOS and prior straits regimes may be as
important as their substance. Moreover, many straits are now de-
fended by sophisticated military hardware, 84 thus potentially ren-
dering it difficult for the United States to successfully protest strait
transit restrictions, even by force.
A third detriment of unilateralism relates to possible United
States inability to claim increased jurisdictional rights485 available
pursuant to UNCLOS but not to customary international law.
According to studies made by the Office of the Geographer of the
United States and others, the United States was the largest single
beneficiary of territorial and resource jurisdiction under UNCLOS'
provisions. 486 While the United States has already claimed a 200-
mile economic zone, claims to a 12-mile territorial sea, a 24-mile
contiguous zone, 487 and, most likely, a continental shelf extending
all the way to the continental margin 488 could not be made by the
United States without estopping it from denying the validity of
similar claims by others. Moreover, as has been suggested, if the
United States were to assert the most extensive jurisdiction permit-
ted by UNCLOS, it could find itself estopped from denying the
validity of the rest of the "package. ' 489
482. See supra text accompanying notes 407-09, 414-18.
483. Professor McDougal, for example, has stated that: "I've read the document care-
fully, from end to end, and I can't find the guarantee there. In fact, I find the opposite, that
the coastal state is given all kinds of competencies over passage that it never had before."
McDougal, supra note 390, at 81. See also Reisman, The Regime of Straits and National
Security: An Appraisal of International Lawmaking, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 48, 67-75 (1980).
Contra Moore, The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 77, 90-110 (1980).
484. Hazlett, Strait Shooting, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROCEEDINcS, June, 1982, at 70, 71. See
generally Pirtle, supra note 415, passim (transit rights through international straits).
485. See supra text accompanying notes 410-22.
486. Wertenbaker-I, supra note 77, at 45.
487. Compare UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 33(2) ("contiguous zone may not extend
beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines") with Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra
note 415, art. 24(2) ("contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the base-
line").
488. Compare Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 471, art. I (defining
continental shelf) with UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 76(1) (defining continental shelf).
489. See supra text accompanying notes 410-22.
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A further detriment of unilateralism (which may, from some
perspectives, be perceived as a benefit 490 ) concerns the absence of a
system of courts for prompt and sure adjudication of oceanic juris-
dictional and navigational claims. 49 1 A correlative problem would
arise from the lack of certainty of title to recovered nodules pro-
vided by the UNCLOS regime. 4 2 Although the United States' legal
position concerning freedom of the seabeds is strong, it is limited by
the principle that exclusive claims to particular seabed tracts cannot
be asserted without violating the prohibition on sovereign claims
articulated, inter alia, by the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. 493
The result of the United States' inability to assert exclusive seabed
claims other than as reciprocally recognized through the tentative
"alternative" regime 49 4 could produce deterrent effects on seabed
miners, and more importantly, their investors. As Robert Goldwin
has noted,
Although the fisheries analogy 49' has superficial appeal, as Elliot
Richardson pointed out in a speech to the American Mining
Congress last year, because deep sea bed nodules can't swim,
and sea bed miners aren't fisherman, miners must have an exclu-
sive legal right to a suitable ore body before they undertake the
large, long-term investments necessary to recover and process
[them].496
Moreover, the principal financial institutions which underwrite
seabed mining have indicated that they would not finance further
technological development of actual mining operations without a
satisfactory sea treaty, and that they did not consider the recipro-
cating states regime to be a viable alternative. 497 This problem,
490. But see Wertenbaker-I, supra note 77, at 40 (quoting former U.S. Representative
Paul McClosky's contention that the certainty afforded by these provisions alone outweighs
the value of the seabed minerals likely to be recovered by the United States).
491. See UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 76(8) & Annexes 2, 6.
492. Id. Annex 3, art. 1; see generally Arrow, The Proposed Regime, supra note 4, at
405-06.
493. High Seas Convention, supra note 3, art. 2. See also Arrow, The Customary Norm,
supra note 51, at 12-16 (principle that the deep seabed is subject to the use and enjoyment of
all).
494. See supra text accompanying notes 218-43.
495. See supra text accompanying note 3.
496. Coldwin, supra note 436, at 47. See also Arrow, The Proposed Regime, supra note
4, at 406-07 (importance of exclusive exploitation rights).
497. COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., IMPEDIMENTS TO UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN
DEEP OCEN MINING CAN BE OvERcOME 3 (1982), cited in Grolin, supra note 480, at 22.
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combined with the uncertainty of seabed mining economic re-
turns, 4 8 could well prove of dispositive importance in financing
United States nationals' mining ventures-absent the United States'
participation in the UNCLOS regime.
The final detriment of unilateralism concerns the general issue
of perceived United States concern for international distributive
justice and good faith. 499 Along these lines, Wertenbaker has ques-
tioned the general ability of other states to negotiate in good faith
with the United States, if the United States turns its back on an
agreement negotiated over ten years and four presidential adminis-
trations. 50 0 More specifically, Ambassador Keith Brennan of Aus-
tralia has remarked that
[t]he new law is a better law than the old law it replaces-or
than the absence of any law at all, which it also replaces in
many areas .... The old law of the sea began to break up
because of its inherent inequity. Beyond three miles, it was "first
come, first serve," and wealthy countries could sail thousands of
miles after a resource, while poorer countries could not-though
they were just as free to. Some people were not getting a fair
share even of fish off their own coasts. Peru was as free to fish off
Russia as Russia was to fish off Peru, but somehow it never did.
The new law is a fairer one than what previously applied.
Morally, it is vastly superior. 50
Along similar lines, Judge Philip Jessup has observed that
[t]he theme of Grotius that the common interest of mankind in
the great oceans must prevail over the selfish mercantile interests
of a few . . . is a foundation of all international law. To oppose
a modern restatement of the law of the sea in order to promote
newly found mercantile interests at the risk of prejudicing other
common interests in the seas . . . is to invite anarchic disregard
of all international law. 502
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Thus, while the economic costs of UNCLOS to the United
States are severe, the moral and political costs of nonparticipation
may be equally weighty. Unfortunately, at this point, the
UNCLOS III negotiations are over, the text has now been finalized,
and the battle lines now drawn. The confrontation scenario, for the
moment, is therefore likely to continue to play itself out.
